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   When	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  ended	  in	  December	  of	  1995,	  after	  three	  and	  a	  half	  
years	  of	  brutal	  ethnic	  conflict,	  there	  was	  tremendous	  hope	  for	  the	  reconstruction	  
and	  rehabilitation	  of	  the	  country.	  The	  war	  ended	  in	  the	  signing	  of	  the	  Dayton	  
Accords	  by	  the	  presidents	  of	  the	  Serbian,	  Croatian,	  and	  Bosnian	  Republics	  of	  the	  
Yugoslav	  Federation.	  The	  purpose	  of	  these	  accords	  was	  both	  to	  end	  the	  war	  in	  
Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina,	  and	  to	  provide	  a	  framework	  for	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  Bosnia’s	  
state	  institutions.1	  The	  accords	  were	  successful	  in	  bringing	  peace	  to	  Bosnia,	  but	  
their	  reconstruction	  framework	  involved	  two	  factors	  that	  contributed	  to	  a	  lack	  of	  
institutional	  growth	  in	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina:	  the	  continued	  involvement	  of	  external	  
actors	  in	  Bosnian	  affairs	  (through	  the	  establishment	  of	  international	  organizations	  
intended	  to	  oversee	  Bosnia’s	  reconstruction	  process),	  and	  the	  decentralization	  of	  
the	  Bosnian	  state	  (through	  the	  creation	  of	  two	  semi-­‐autonomous	  entities	  within	  
Bosnia:	  the	  Federation	  of	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina,	  and	  the	  Republika	  Srpska).23	  The	  
puzzle	  that	  emerges	  from	  this	  flawed	  reconstruction	  process	  lies	  in	  identifying	  what	  
went	  wrong	  in	  Bosnia.	  Were	  particular	  variables	  overlooked	  in	  this	  process,	  and	  if	  
so,	  could	  they	  have	  led	  to	  a	  better	  outcome	  for	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina?	  The	  importance	  
of	  this	  question	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that,	  despite	  the	  ongoing	  efforts	  of	  policy-­‐makers,	  
Bosnia	  remains	  mired	  in	  instability	  with	  no	  constituent	  support	  for	  state	  
                                                
1 “Bosnia-Herzegovina,” or “Bosnia and Herzegovina” is, admittedly, a mouthful. It is acceptable to shorten it either to 
“BiH”—an abbreviation of the Bosnian “Bosna i Hercegovina.”—or, simply, to “Bosnia.” In the interest of simplicity, 
I will refer to “Bosnia-Herzegovina” mostly as “Bosnia.”  
2 Foremost	  among	  the	  international	  institutions	  created	  by	  the	  Dayton	  Accords	  is	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  
Representative	  for	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina,	  whose	  decision-­‐making	  capacity	  still	  props	  up	  Bosnia’s	  institutions. 
3 The ethnic makeup of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, also referred simply as “The Federation,” is mostly 




institutions.	  This	  instability	  increasingly	  leads	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  Bosnia	  will	  
erupt	  in	  another	  outbreak	  of	  ethnic	  conflict.	  	  
The	  problem	  inherent	  in	  the	  Dayton	  Accords	  is	  that	  it	  facilitated	  a	  limiting,	  
one-­‐dimensional	  approach	  to	  Bosnia’s	  reconstruction.	  Dayton	  focused	  exclusively	  
on	  restructuring	  Bosnia	  into	  a	  fully	  functional	  state—relying	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  
changing	  its	  institutional	  and	  structural	  framework.	  	  This	  type	  of	  reconstruction	  
process	  fits	  into	  the	  category	  of	  “statebuilding,”	  defined	  as	  “actions	  undertaken	  by	  
international	  or	  national	  actors	  to	  establish,	  reform,	  or	  strengthen	  the	  institutions	  of	  
the	  state.”4	  The	  problem	  with	  this	  type	  of	  process	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  explicitly	  
provide	  for	  the	  forging	  of	  a	  national	  identity,	  or	  for	  a	  process	  of	  “nation	  building.”5	  
Processes	  of	  nation	  building	  focus	  more	  on	  the	  social	  aspects	  of	  reconstruction,	  and	  
involve	  the	  construction	  of	  national	  identity	  using	  the	  power	  of	  the	  state.	  In	  other	  
words,	  the	  aim	  of	  nation	  building	  is	  to	  unify	  citizens	  in	  order	  to	  mobilize	  them	  
behind	  a	  parallel	  statebuilding	  process,	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  remain	  invested	  in	  
the	  political	  stability	  of	  the	  state.6	  In	  arguing	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  shared	  sense	  of	  
nationhood	  in	  Bosnia,	  I	  highlight	  the	  fact	  that	  nation	  building	  can	  increase	  the	  
success	  of	  a	  parallel	  statebuilding	  process.	  With	  that	  in	  mind,	  I	  situate	  my	  argument	  
with	  the	  literatures	  on	  statebuilding,	  made	  by	  Barnett	  R.	  Rubin,	  Susan	  Woodward,	  
                                                
4 Charles T. Call, Building States to Build Peace (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008): 5. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Nation building is defined as “actions undertaken usually by national actors, to force a sense of common 
nationhood (1) to overcome ethnic, sectarian or communal differences; (2) to counter alternate sources of 
identity and loyalty; and (3) to mobilize a population behind a parallel statebuilding project.” Charles T. 
Call, Building States to Build Peace (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008): 5. 
 
5  
and	  Stephen	  Krasner.	  In	  its	  discussion	  of	  nation	  building,	  this	  paper	  supplements	  
these	  literatures.7	  	  
	  In	  its	  oversight	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  nation	  building,	  I	  posit	  that	  Bosnia’s	  
reconstruction	  process	  discounted	  the	  importance	  of	  three	  variables	  that	  could—
even	  now,	  in	  2012—encourage	  Bosnian	  citizens	  to	  forge	  a	  connection	  to	  their	  newly	  
reconstructed	  state,	  and	  could,	  in	  turn,	  increase	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  
statebuilding	  process.8	  	  I	  identify	  these	  three	  absent	  variables	  as	  education	  (a	  
desegregated	  education	  system),	  citizenship	  (a	  cohesive	  sense	  of	  national	  identity),	  
and	  participation	  (increased	  levels	  of	  political	  participation).	  I	  present	  these	  
variables	  as	  cohesive	  set—they	  build	  off	  of	  each	  other,	  and	  must	  thus	  be	  used	  
sequentially	  in	  order	  to	  successfully	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	  restoration	  of	  
Bosnians’	  faith	  in	  state-­‐level	  politics,	  and	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  
Bosnian	  state.	  	  
	   In	  building	  an	  argument	  for	  these	  variables,	  I	  analyze	  the	  model	  of	  post-­‐
conflict	  reconstruction	  that	  was	  employed	  by	  the	  Clinton	  Administration	  in	  Bosnia	  
in	  conjunction	  with	  an	  alternate	  model	  proposed	  by	  the	  academic,	  Stephen	  L.	  Burg.	  
The	  purpose	  of	  this	  analysis	  is	  to	  pinpoint	  gaps	  in	  these	  models,	  and	  to	  explain	  these	  
gaps	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  statebuilding	  and	  their	  tendency	  to	  
overlook	  variables	  that	  could	  have	  led	  to	  a	  process	  of	  nation	  building.	  This	  paper	  
will	  demonstrate	  that,	  despite	  the	  current	  dysfunctional	  nature	  of	  Bosnian	  
                                                
7 Nation building is defined as “actions undertaken usually by national actors, to force a sense of common 
nationhood (1) to overcome ethnic, sectarian or communal differences; (2) to counter alternate sources of 
identity and loyalty; and (3) to mobilize a population behind a parallel statebuilding project.” Charles T. 
Call, Building States to Build Peace (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008): 5. 
8 It is important to note that although these variables should have been applied at the start of the 
reconstruction process in 1996, their application even now, in 2012, could be just as effective. I posit that 
these variables could be applied at any time in order to increase the functionality of Bosnia’s state. 
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institutions,	  and	  the	  instability	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  whole,	  these	  problems	  could	  be	  
mitigated	  through	  the	  implementation	  of	  policies	  and	  institutions	  designed	  to	  
support	  a	  desegregated	  education	  system,	  a	  cohesive	  national	  identity,	  and	  
increased	  public	  participation	  in	  state-­‐level	  politics.	  	  
	   In	  the	  first	  section	  of	  this	  paper,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  case	  study	  of	  Bosnia	  and	  its	  
levels	  of	  stability	  in	  2012	  to	  explain	  Bosnia’s	  relevance	  as	  an	  example	  of	  a	  failed	  
process	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction.	  I	  will	  explain	  Bosnia’s	  institutional	  structure	  
as	  laid	  out	  by	  the	  Dayton	  Accords	  in	  order	  to	  catalogue	  how	  this	  structure	  has	  
impeded	  Bosnia’s	  institutional	  growth.	  In	  so	  doing,	  I	  will	  offer	  specific	  indicators	  of	  
Bosnia’s	  lack	  of	  growth	  since	  1996.	  	  
The	  second	  section	  will	  offer	  the	  two	  models	  for	  conflict	  mediation	  and	  post-­‐
conflict	  reconstruction:	  first,	  the	  model	  that	  was	  ultimately	  implemented	  by	  the	  
Clinton	  Administration;	  second,	  an	  alternate	  model	  proposed	  by	  the	  academic	  
Stephen	  L.	  Burg,	  in	  2005.9	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  section	  is	  to	  identify	  the	  gaps	  in	  these	  
two	  models,	  and	  to	  analyze	  the	  gaps	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  frameworks	  
of	  statebuilding.	  Ultimately,	  this	  section	  will	  explain	  how	  the	  variables	  I	  have	  
identified	  could	  fill	  in	  these	  gaps	  in	  order	  to	  solve	  problems	  that	  other	  models	  were	  
unable	  to	  resolve.	  
In	  the	  third	  section	  of	  this	  paper	  I	  offer	  and	  detail	  the	  variables	  I	  have	  
identified	  for	  conflict	  mediation	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction:	  education,	  
citizenship,	  and	  political	  participation.	  This	  set	  of	  variables	  begins	  with	  the	  
establishment	  of	  a	  desegregated	  education	  system—a	  system	  that	  I	  suggest	  would	  
                                                
9 Steven L. Burg is an expert on ethnic politics, Balkan politics, Ethnic conflict, and conflict management. 
He currently teaches at Brandeis University.   
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have	  allowed	  younger	  generations	  of	  Bosnians	  to	  develop	  a	  shared	  sense	  of	  
citizenship	  (or,	  a	  more	  homogenized	  notion	  of	  what	  it	  is	  to	  be	  “Bosnian”).	  This,	  in	  
turn,	  would	  have	  inspired	  participation	  in	  state-­‐level	  politics.	  Ultimately,	  I	  argue	  
that	  these	  three	  variables	  could—even	  now	  in	  2012—work	  to	  increase	  constituent	  
interest	  in	  state	  politics,	  and	  thus	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  state.	  This	  
section	  also	  offers	  an	  explanation	  of	  implications	  that	  these	  variables	  could	  have	  on	  
future	  post-­‐conflict	  cases.	  My	  fourth	  and	  concluding	  section	  will	  sum	  up	  my	  findings	  


















2.	  Methodology	  	  
Research	  Methods	  
I	  began	  my	  research	  at	  Oberlin	  College	  examining	  secondary	  sources—both	  
books,	  and	  scholarly	  articles—on	  general	  theories	  of	  conflict	  mediation	  and	  post-­‐
conflict	  resolution,	  and	  on	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  War.	  Next,	  I	  examined	  reports	  
from	  think	  tanks,	  scholars	  (theorists,	  practitioners,	  and	  their	  critics),	  as	  well	  as	  
official	  reports	  from	  various	  international	  organizations	  including	  the	  United	  
Nations,	  the	  International	  Crisis	  Group,	  and	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Representative	  for	  
Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina.	  Thirdly,	  I	  read	  the	  memoirs	  of	  actors	  who	  were	  directly	  
involved	  in	  the	  negotiation	  process,	  including	  those	  of	  Chief	  Negotiator	  Richard	  
Holbrooke,	  and	  U.S.	  Secretary	  of	  State	  Warren	  Christopher.	  	  
The	  second	  segment	  of	  my	  research	  was	  conducted	  at	  the	  Library	  of	  
Congress,	  in	  Washington	  D.C.,	  funded	  by	  grants	  from	  Oberlin	  College’s	  Politics	  
Department	  (The	  Jere	  Bruner	  Research	  Grant),	  and	  Sociology	  Department	  (The	  
Jerome	  Davis	  Research	  Grant).	  The	  purpose	  of	  this	  segment	  of	  my	  research	  was	  to	  
collect	  primary	  and	  secondary	  sources,	  including	  congressional	  reports	  and	  official	  
documents	  from	  President	  Clinton’s	  collection.	  This	  research	  was	  intended	  to	  
inform	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  Clinton	  administration’s	  decision-­‐making	  process.	  I	  
specifically	  read	  documents	  that	  explained	  how	  the	  opinions	  of	  actors	  in	  the	  






Defending	  my	  Case	  Study	  	  
In	  order	  to	  determine	  if	  Bosnia	  was	  primed	  for	  continued	  analysis	  and	  study,	  
I	  examined	  various	  sources	  that	  gauge	  Bosnia’s	  political,	  social,	  and	  economic	  
stability	  up	  until	  2011.	  My	  principal	  source	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  Bosnia’s	  political,	  
social,	  and	  economic	  stability	  was	  the	  Fund	  for	  Peace’s	  Failed	  State	  Index,	  an	  online	  
index	  that	  collects	  information	  from	  thousands	  of	  sources,	  and	  distills	  them	  into	  one	  
cohesive	  set	  of	  indicators	  that	  detail	  the	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  pressures	  
facing	  177	  countries.10	  In	  2005,	  ten	  years	  after	  the	  cessation	  of	  hostilities,	  Bosnia	  
ranked	  twenty-­‐two	  out	  of	  177,	  placing	  it	  in	  the	  category	  of	  countries	  that	  are	  
considered	  “critical.”	  Six	  years	  later,	  in	  2011,	  Bosnia	  ranked	  sixty-­‐nine	  in	  the	  index,	  
rising	  to	  the	  category	  of	  countries	  that	  are	  in	  “danger,”	  but	  are	  no	  longer	  “critical.”	  
While	  Bosnia’s	  level	  of	  stability	  has	  risen	  considerably	  between	  2005	  and	  2011,	  
steady	  improvement	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  suggest	  that	  Bosnia	  has	  achieved	  the	  level	  of	  
stability	  necessary	  for	  it	  to	  be	  categorized	  as	  a	  fully	  functional	  state.	  	  
In	  2010,	  Bosnia’s	  lowest	  rankings	  in	  the	  fourteen	  subcategories	  of	  social,	  
political,	  and	  economic	  pressures	  were	  in	  the	  subcategories	  of	  “rise	  of	  factionalized	  
elites,”	  and	  “vengeance	  seeking	  group	  grievance.”11	  The	  rankings	  in	  these	  categories	  
are	  particularly	  excellent	  indicators	  that	  the	  Dayton	  Accords	  did	  not	  manage	  to	  
resolve	  root	  causes	  of	  the	  conflict—the	  country’s	  experiences	  with	  the	  factionalized	  
elites	  of	  its	  three	  main	  ethnic	  groups,	  and	  long-­‐term	  political	  and	  social	  grievances	  
                                                
10 The Fund for Peace’s index defines “state failure” as a variety of factors that include the loss of physical 
control of its territory, the monopoly on the legitimate use of force, the erosion of legitimate authority to 
make collective decisions, and the inability to provide reasonable public services. 
The Failed State Index, Frequently Asked Questions: http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi-faq#5 
11 The Failed State Index, Conflict Indicators: http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=indicators 
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amongst	  these	  groups.	  Bosnia’s	  low	  rankings	  in	  these	  important	  categories	  suggest	  
dangerously	  low	  levels	  of	  stability	  for	  a	  transitional	  country.	  As	  a	  state	  in	  its	  post-­‐
conflict	  years,	  Bosnia	  had	  not	  made	  significant	  progress	  towards	  becoming	  a	  stable	  
and	  functional	  nation.	  This	  source,	  and	  each	  of	  the	  other	  sources	  that	  I	  referenced,	  
point	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  in	  the	  fifteen	  years	  after	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Dayton	  
Accords,	  Bosnia	  has	  failed	  to	  achieve	  optimal	  levels	  of	  political	  stability;	  thus,	  Bosnia	  
proved	  to	  be	  ripe	  for	  analysis.	  	  
Therefore,	  in	  choosing	  a	  case	  study,	  I	  chose	  to	  focus	  on	  Bosnia,	  and	  Bosnia	  
alone.	  My	  project	  involves	  the	  analysis	  of	  multiple	  social	  variables	  (such	  as	  
education,	  citizenship,	  and	  political	  participation)	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  Bosnia’s	  
reconstruction	  process	  are	  so	  complicated	  and	  so	  specific	  to	  Bosnia’s	  own	  process,	  
that	  a	  comparison,	  or	  the	  use	  of	  multiple	  case	  studies	  would	  not	  add	  anything	  to	  my	  
argument.	  Thus,	  I	  elected	  to	  employ	  Bosnia	  as	  a	  single	  holistic	  case	  study	  in	  order	  to	  
effectively	  explain	  and	  analyze	  the	  factors	  in	  full	  detail.	  In	  looking	  at	  Bosnia	  alone,	  I	  
am	  able	  to	  fully	  examine	  the	  intricacies	  of	  its	  reconstruction	  process,	  and	  to	  analyze	  







                                                
12 Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, “Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation 
for Novice Researchers,” The Qualitative Report 13.4 (December 2008). 
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3.	  Literature	  Review	  	  
Barnett	  R.	  Rubin,	  Stephen	  L.	  Krasner,	  and	  Susan	  Woodward	  analyze	  
distinctly	  different	  points	  in	  the	  statebuilding	  and	  peacebuilding	  processes	  of	  post-­‐
conflict	  and	  transitional	  states.	  Barnett	  R.	  Rubin	  and	  Stephen	  L	  Krasner	  analyze	  the	  
very	  beginning	  of	  the	  statebuilding	  process,	  where	  the	  cessation	  of	  hostilities	  and	  
the	  establishment	  of	  a	  successful	  transitional	  government	  are	  the	  most	  pressing	  
goals.	  Susan	  Woodward	  instead	  analyzes	  a	  later	  stage	  in	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  
reconstruction	  process,	  and	  thus	  is	  able	  to	  focus	  on	  longer-­‐term	  problems	  of	  
reform.13	  My	  analysis	  focuses	  primarily	  on	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  transitional	  
government,	  however	  Woodward’s	  work	  is	  important	  in	  highlighting	  the	  potential	  
long-­‐term	  effects	  of	  a	  flawed	  reconstruction	  process.	  Before	  proceeding,	  it	  is	  
important	  to	  call	  attention	  to	  Rubin’s	  warning	  that	  peacekeeping	  and	  peacebuilding	  
should	  not	  be	  conflated.	  A	  sustainable	  ceasefire,	  Dayton’s	  first	  goal,	  was	  an	  
acceptable	  standard	  for	  keeping	  the	  peace,	  but	  it	  was	  insufficient	  for	  having	  
consolidated	  or	  institutionalized	  peace.14	  	  
Rubin	  further	  argues	  that	  statebuilding	  and	  peacebuilding	  operations	  require	  
the	  short-­‐term	  assistance	  of	  external	  actors,	  as	  failed	  or	  failing	  states	  lack	  the	  
resources	  and	  state	  capacity	  necessary	  to	  autonomously	  “implement	  sustainable	  
                                                
13 Stephen L. Burg, “Intractability and Third-Party Mediation in the Balkans,” in Grasping the Nettle: 
Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, ed. Chester A. Crocker (Endowment of the United States Institute 
of Peace, 2005); Stephen D. Krasner, “Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failed 
States”,” International Security (Fall 2004); Stephen D. Krasner, “Think Again: Sovereignty,” Foreign 
Policy (January 1, 2001); Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and the Dissolution After the Cold 
War (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995); Susan Woodward, “A European ‘New Deal’ for 
the Balkans,” Foreign Affairs (1995). 
14 Rubin defines statebuilding as “the interrelated establishment and stabilization of control of the means of 
legitimate violence and authority, combined with the mobilization of resources to sustain these institutions, 
constitutes the process of statebuilding.” Rubin, “The Politics of Security in Postconflict Statebuilding”: 31. 
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transformation	  of	  political	  structures	  and	  statebuilding.”15	  The	  crux	  of	  Rubin’s	  
argument	  hinges	  on	  his	  definition	  of	  three	  factors:	  coercion,	  capital,	  and	  legitimacy.	  
He	  posits	  that	  these	  three	  factors	  must	  be	  incorporated	  into	  an	  externally	  organized	  
statebuilding	  process	  in	  order	  to	  successfully	  assist	  a	  transitional	  state	  in	  becoming	  
a	  fully	  functional	  nation-­‐state.16	  	  
Rubin’s	  definition	  of	  “coercion”	  hinges	  on	  a)	  the	  involvement	  of	  a	  transitional	  
international	  security	  provisions,	  b)	  the	  establishment	  of	  new	  security	  agencies	  or	  
the	  reform	  of	  existing	  ones,	  and	  c)	  the	  provision	  of	  security	  for	  political	  processes.	  In	  
other	  words,	  the	  use	  of	  “coercion”	  in	  a	  statebuilding	  process	  leads	  to	  higher	  levels	  of	  
internal	  security	  in	  a	  transitional	  state.	  “Capital”	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  both	  international	  
financial	  assistance	  for	  recovery,	  and	  reconstruction;	  as	  well	  as	  the	  development	  of	  
efforts	  to	  invigorate	  both	  the	  national	  economy,	  and	  the	  fiscal	  capacity	  of	  the	  
government.	  The	  inclusion	  of	  “legitimacy”	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  a	  statebuilding	  process	  can	  
enable	  states	  to	  “develop	  inclusive,	  fully	  representative,	  and	  capable	  government;	  to	  
protect	  the	  rights	  of	  broad	  participation;	  and	  to	  shield	  vulnerable	  people	  from	  
threats.”17	  Though	  partially	  dependent	  on	  initial	  conditions	  within	  the	  transitional	  
country,	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  peacebuilding	  operation	  relies	  on	  the	  successful	  
manipulation	  of	  these	  three	  factors.	  
Rubin’s	  work	  highlights	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  involvement	  of	  external	  actors	  in	  
peacebuilding	  and	  statebuilding	  operations	  is	  not	  inherently	  problematic.	  Problems	  
with	  external	  involvement	  arise	  when	  the	  assisting	  state	  considers	  its	  own	  needs	  
                                                
15 Rubin, 41. 
16 Burg attributes the development of these three factors to Charles Tilly. 
17 Rubin, 28-29. 
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and	  security	  interests	  over	  those	  of	  the	  transitional	  state.18	  Such	  operations	  can	  
appear	  to	  undermine	  transitional	  administrations	  instead	  of	  working	  to	  assist	  them.	  
Rubin	  discourages	  any	  involvement	  in	  peacebuilding	  and	  statebuilding	  processes	  
that	  is	  based	  solely	  on	  security	  interests,	  and	  suggests	  that	  external	  actors	  must	  
legitimate	  their	  objectives	  in	  order	  for	  their	  involvement	  to	  be	  welcomed	  by	  local	  
actors.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  successfully	  legitimate	  their	  objectives,	  external	  actors	  must	  help	  
the	  transitional	  governments	  establish	  a	  broad	  consensus	  on	  the	  form	  of	  
government	  institutions,	  and	  on	  the	  “structure	  of	  the	  state	  to	  which	  officials	  will	  be	  
elected,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  electoral	  system	  and	  administration.”19	  In	  other	  words,	  
international	  statebuilding	  operations	  must	  help	  establish	  a	  functional	  government,	  
but	  this	  government	  cannot	  exclusively	  rely	  on	  external	  actors	  for	  assistance.	  The	  
purpose	  of	  peacebuilding	  and	  statebuilding	  operations	  is	  to	  rebuild	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  
government	  institutions	  by	  increasing	  political	  participation,	  and	  by	  increasing	  the	  
government’s	  capacity	  to	  mobilize	  and	  deliver	  resources.20	  Rubin	  posits	  that	  
building	  national	  capacity	  for	  security	  and	  legitimate	  governance	  is	  also	  “key	  to	  
sustaining	  peace.”21	  	  
Here,	  Krasner’s	  theory	  of	  sovereignty	  offers	  an	  alternative	  to	  Rubin’s	  vision	  
of	  the	  nature	  of	  external	  involvement	  in	  peacebuilding	  and	  statebuilding.	  Krasner’s	  
theory	  hinges	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  state	  legitimacy	  and	  sovereignty	  is	  necessary	  
in	  order	  for	  a	  transitional	  state	  to	  become	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  nation	  state.	  	  Sovereignty	  
                                                
18 Rubin, 27-28. 
19 Rubin, 35. 
20 Rubin, 43. 
21 Rubin, 34. 
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theory	  posits	  that	  badly	  governed	  states,	  if	  left	  to	  their	  own	  devices,	  are	  unable	  to	  
solve	  their	  own	  problems.	  This	  is	  due	  largely	  to	  their	  limited	  administrative	  
capacity,	  and	  to	  their	  inability	  to	  maintain	  internal	  security.	  Krasner	  argues	  that	  the	  
policy	  tools	  currently	  available	  to	  external	  actors—governance	  assistance	  and	  
transitional	  administration—are	  inadequate	  for	  increasing	  the	  sovereignty	  and	  
capacity	  of	  these	  ailing	  states.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  inadequacies,	  Krasner	  argues	  for	  
alternative	  institutional	  arrangements	  supported	  by	  external	  actors—such	  as	  de	  
facto	  trusteeships	  and	  shared	  sovereignty	  contracts—to	  be	  added	  to	  the	  list	  of	  policy	  
options	  for	  dealing	  with	  failed	  or	  post-­‐conflict	  states.	  	  
Krasner’s	  definition	  of	  contemporary	  international	  legal	  sovereignty	  involves	  
the	  recognition	  of	  states	  as	  juridically	  independent	  territorial	  entities.	  The	  
overarching	  notion	  of	  Krasner’s	  conception	  of	  sovereignty	  (also	  referred	  to	  as	  
Westphalian,	  or	  Vatellian	  sovereignty)	  is	  the	  idea	  these	  states	  are	  not	  formally	  
subject	  to	  external	  authority.	  Sovereign	  states	  have	  de	  facto	  autonomy,	  implying	  
that	  states	  should	  refrain	  at	  all	  costs	  from	  intervening	  in	  each	  others’	  internal	  
affairs.22	  	  
Krasner	  argues	  that	  the	  international	  political	  system	  has	  seen	  the	  
emergence	  of	  “post-­‐Westphalian	  sovereignty,”	  wherein	  the	  dictates	  of	  Westphalian	  
sovereignty	  are	  ignored	  by	  powerful	  states	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  perceived	  security	  crisis.	  
Using	  the	  case	  of	  Bosnia	  as	  an	  example,	  Krasner	  points	  out	  that	  “the	  president	  of	  the	  
United	  States	  or	  the	  prime	  minister	  of	  Britain	  did	  not	  have	  to	  argue	  that	  sovereignty	  
[was]	  dead	  in	  order	  to	  place	  NATO	  troops	  in	  Bosnia.”	  In	  fact,	  he	  argues	  that	  the	  
                                                
22 Stephen Krasner, “Abiding Sovereignty,” International Political Science Review (2001): 23. 
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rationale	  for	  the	  deployment	  of	  these	  troops	  may	  well	  have	  been	  that	  their	  purpose	  
was	  “to	  restore	  effective	  domestic	  sovereignty	  to	  Bosnia.”23	  Krasner	  argues	  that	  
external	  intervention	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  directly	  in	  line	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  
sovereignty	  as	  long	  its	  apparent	  purpose	  is	  to	  restore	  domestic	  sovereignty	  to	  the	  
transitional	  state.	  
The	  use	  of	  de	  facto	  trusteeships	  and	  shared	  sovereignty	  contracts	  could	  
decrease	  the	  security	  threats	  posed	  by	  these	  unstable	  states,	  and	  could	  also	  assist	  
transitional	  states	  in	  achieving	  optimal	  levels	  of	  stability.	  A	  de	  facto	  trusteeship	  
would	  involve	  a	  major	  state	  or	  international	  organization	  assuming	  protectorate	  
responsibility	  for	  a	  transitional	  country.	  Use	  of	  a	  de	  facto	  trusteeship	  would	  allow	  
international	  actors	  to	  assume	  control	  over	  the	  local	  politics	  of	  the	  transitional	  state	  
for	  an	  indefinite	  period	  of	  time.	  Krasner’s	  conception	  of	  a	  shared	  sovereignty	  
contract	  follows	  in	  a	  similar	  vein—these	  contracts	  would	  increase	  joint	  authority	  
structures	  in	  transitional	  state	  and	  would	  also	  allow	  external	  actors	  to	  assume	  
responsibility	  for	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  transitional	  state.	  	  
Krasner	  argues	  that	  the	  use	  of	  de	  facto	  trusteeships	  and	  shared	  sovereignty	  
contracts	  would	  not	  necessarily	  strip	  the	  transitional	  state	  of	  all	  decision-­‐making	  
capabilities.	  Ideally,	  both	  options	  would	  necessitate	  considerable	  involvement	  from	  
local	  political	  actors	  and	  would	  involve	  accountability	  mechanisms	  to	  systematically	  
engage	  local	  actors	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  hindering	  local	  statebuilding	  efforts.	  Bosnia’s	  
experience	  with	  external	  governance	  exemplifies	  Krasner’s	  understanding	  of	  what	  
could	  happen	  if	  an	  externally	  led	  reconstruction	  process	  failed	  to	  involve	  such	  
                                                
23 Stephen Krasner, “Think Again: Sovereignty,” Foreign Policy (January 1, 2001). 
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accountability	  mechanisms.	  In	  Bosnia,	  the	  lack	  of	  these	  mechanisms	  led	  to	  the	  
excessive	  and	  continued	  presence	  of	  external	  actors.	  As	  such,	  the	  transitional	  
administration	  never	  successfully	  transitioned	  into	  a	  full-­‐fledged	  and	  fully	  
functional	  government.	  	  
An	  alternative	  explanation	  for	  the	  failures	  of	  Bosnia’s	  transitional	  
administration	  is	  that	  residual	  ethnic	  issues	  have	  hindered	  the	  successful	  
achievement	  of	  state-­‐level	  legitimacy,	  and	  have	  ensured	  that	  the	  Bosnian	  polity	  
remains	  more	  committed	  to	  local,	  ethnically	  based	  politics	  than	  to	  politics	  on	  the	  
national	  scale.	  Krasner’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  failure	  of	  Bosnia’s	  transitional	  
administration,	  coupled	  with	  Bosnia’s	  lack	  of	  successful	  state-­‐level	  politics	  relates	  
directly	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  using	  “legitimacy”	  to	  help	  transitional	  administrations	  
achieve	  nation-­‐state	  status.	  
It	  is	  hard	  to	  fault	  the	  polity	  itself	  for	  its	  lack	  of	  commitment	  to	  state-­‐level	  
politics.	  The	  phenomenon	  of	  low	  political	  participation	  in	  Bosnia	  is	  reflective	  both	  of	  
the	  fact	  that	  the	  state	  has	  never	  shown	  a	  commitment	  to	  assisting	  its	  constituents,	  
and	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  system	  set	  up	  by	  the	  Dayton	  Accords	  necessarily	  
decentralized	  the	  Bosnian	  political	  system	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  there	  was	  no	  incentive	  
for	  political	  participation	  at	  the	  national	  level.	  While	  participatory	  politics	  does	  not	  
equate	  to	  liberal	  democracy,	  it	  does	  offer	  a	  mechanism	  for	  “aggrieved	  social	  groups	  
to	  feel	  that	  they	  have	  both	  a	  voice	  and	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  national	  political	  system.”24	  
Participatory	  national	  politics	  could	  provide	  Bosnians	  with	  an	  alternative	  outlet	  for	  
venting	  their	  ethnic	  frustrations.	  	  
                                                
24 Charles T. Call, “Ending Wars, Building States,” in Building States to Build Peace: 7. 
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   While	  Krasner’s	  sovereignty	  theory	  fits	  neatly	  into	  Rubin’s	  category	  of	  
“legitimacy,”	  Susan	  Woodward’s	  variables	  relate	  instead	  into	  Rubin’s	  variable	  
“capital.”	  Woodward	  agrees	  with	  Rubin’s	  assertion	  that	  one	  of	  the	  essential	  means	  
of	  successfully	  reconstructing	  a	  state	  is	  to	  use	  capital	  in	  the	  form	  of	  international	  
financial	  assistance	  for	  recovery,	  for	  reconstruction,	  and	  for	  development	  of	  efforts	  
to	  invigorate	  both	  the	  national	  economy	  and	  the	  fiscal	  capacity	  of	  the	  government.	  
However,	  in	  the	  Bosnian	  case,	  Woodward	  does	  not	  believe	  in	  channeling	  aid	  through	  
the	  state.	  In	  1999,	  four	  years	  after	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  Dayton	  Accords,	  
Woodward	  viewed	  the	  Bosnian	  state	  as	  having	  lost	  the	  legitimacy	  necessary	  to	  
achieve	  economic	  reform	  at	  the	  state-­‐level.	  As	  such,	  Woodward	  does	  not	  even	  
attempt	  to	  find	  a	  solution	  that	  would	  allow	  for	  the	  regrowth	  of	  Bosnia’s	  institutions.	  
Woodward	  claims	  that	  capital	  could	  support	  “the	  development	  of	  the	  political	  
institutions	  and	  a	  political	  climate”	  and	  that	  this	  could	  “enable	  the	  people	  
themselves	  to	  generate	  solutions,”	  but	  that	  this	  would	  have	  required	  a	  more	  stable	  
environment	  and	  support	  network	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  statebuilding	  process.	  	  
Instead,	  Woodward’s	  capital-­‐based	  proposal	  for	  revamping	  the	  Bosnian	  
economy	  involves	  the	  early	  staged	  entry	  into	  liberal	  European	  economic	  regimes	  in	  
order	  to	  encourage	  private-­‐sector	  development	  and	  to	  reduce	  the	  state’s	  economic	  
role.25	  Apart	  from	  her	  perception	  of	  the	  state’s	  lack	  of	  legitimacy,	  the	  other	  pitfall	  of	  
channeling	  aid	  through	  governments	  is	  that	  it	  would	  reinforce	  state	  patronage	  and	  
protectionism,	  and	  inhibit	  “new	  private	  businesses	  and	  cross-­‐border	  economic	  
                                                
25 Susan Woodward, “A European ‘New Deal’ for the Balkans,” Foreign Affairs (1995): 98. 
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ties.”26	  As	  a	  solution	  to	  her	  perceived	  problems	  of	  state-­‐legitimacy,	  Woodward	  
advocates	  for	  the	  use	  of	  cross-­‐border	  cooperation	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  mutual	  economic	  
self-­‐interest,	  claiming	  that	  this	  would	  be	  less	  likely	  than	  state	  initiatives	  to	  be	  
disrupted	  by	  political	  disputes.27	  	  
	  Woodward’s	  call	  for	  the	  channeling	  of	  external	  financial	  aid	  to	  non-­‐state	  
institutions	  differs	  slightly	  from	  Rubin’s	  recommendations.	  In	  Rubin’s	  eyes,	  this	  use	  
of	  external	  funding	  is	  dangerous,	  as	  it	  could	  be	  used	  to	  fund	  “the	  creation	  of	  national	  
capacities,	  institutions,	  and	  the	  development	  of	  parallel	  systems	  that	  suck	  capacity	  
out	  of	  national	  institutions	  and	  create	  unsustainable	  white	  elephants.”28	  Rubin’s	  
conception	  of	  capital	  and	  external	  aid	  in	  post-­‐conflict	  situations	  is	  that	  it	  should	  be	  
used	  to	  enable	  the	  state	  to	  encourage	  investment,	  free	  markets,	  and	  economic	  
development.”29	  	  This	  process	  could	  increase	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  external	  actors,	  and	  
of	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  state	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  international	  resources,	  or	  
capacities	  capable	  of	  covering	  initial	  gaps	  in	  the	  process.	  	  
I	  focus	  my	  paper	  on	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  reconstruction	  process—the	  
stages	  analyzed	  by	  both	  Rubin	  and	  Krasner.	  My	  hope	  is	  to	  understand	  what	  went	  
wrong	  with	  the	  Dayton	  Accords	  in	  order	  to	  find	  a	  realistic	  and	  viable	  solution	  for	  




                                                
26 Susan Woodward, “A European ‘New Deal’ for the Balkans,”:103. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Rubin, “The Politics of Security in Postconflict Statebuilding”: 28. 
29 Rubin: 43. 
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4.	  The	  Case	  Study:	  Explaining	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  
	  The	  conflict	  mediation	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction	  process	  ultimately	  
implemented	  by	  the	  United	  States	  was	  successful	  in	  that	  it	  managed	  to	  end	  the	  
brutal	  Bosnian	  War.	  The	  failure	  of	  this	  process	  lay	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  did	  not	  
successfully	  increase	  the	  state’s	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐governance.	  The	  continued	  
involvement	  of	  external	  actors	  in	  Bosnian	  politics	  has	  lowered	  the	  incentive	  for	  local	  
actors	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  reconstruction	  process	  through	  attempts	  to	  implement	  
much	  needed	  reforms	  to	  its	  political,	  social,	  and	  economic	  institutions.	  Bosnia’s	  
unemployment	  rates,	  levels	  of	  government	  corruption,	  and	  lack	  of	  economic	  growth	  
all	  point	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  over	  the	  past	  fifteen	  years,	  Bosnia	  has	  not	  experienced	  the	  
healthy	  growth	  that	  would	  have	  emerged	  from	  the	  implementation	  of	  successful	  
reforms.	  In	  analyzing	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  lack	  of	  growth,	  I	  first	  examine	  the	  political	  
institutions	  established	  by	  the	  Dayton	  Accords.	  
In	  laying	  the	  framework	  for	  the	  structure	  of	  these	  institutions,	  the	  accords’	  
first	  move	  was	  to	  decentralize	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  state.	  First,	  the	  accords	  split	  the	  
country	  into	  two	  semi-­‐autonomous	  entities:	  The	  Republika	  Srpska	  and	  the	  
Federation	  of	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina.30	  The	  ethnic	  makeup	  of	  these	  two	  entities	  is	  
fairly	  homogenized—the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Bosnian	  Croats	  and	  Bosniaks	  live	  within	  
the	  Federation,	  while	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  live	  mainly	  within	  the	  Republic.	  The	  decision	  to	  
                                                
30 The Washington Agreement, signed on March 18, 1994, had recognized the Federation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina as a semi-autonomous entity within Bosnia-Herzegovina. The political significance of this 
decision was two-fold: firstly, it helped appease Bosnian Muslims who viewed the creation of the 
Federation as a first step towards recognition, and it served as a ceasefire agreement between the Croatian 
Republic of Herzeg-Bosnia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Under the Washington  
Agreement the territories held by the Croat and Bosnian national forces was divided into self-governing 
cantons that made up the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The intention of this division was to 
prevent the continued dominance of one ethnic group over another. 
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grant	  these	  entities	  complete	  autonomy	  over	  local	  political	  decisions	  has	  had	  a	  
detrimental	  effect	  on	  the	  capacity	  of	  state-­‐level	  institutions.	  
	  In	  delineating	  the	  entities	  around	  ethnic	  lines,	  the	  accords	  guaranteed	  that	  
the	  political	  processes	  of	  these	  two	  entities	  would	  be	  grounded	  in	  ethnically	  based	  
issues.	  The	  accords’	  creation	  of	  sub-­‐national,	  or	  regional	  politics	  also	  ensured	  that	  
the	  Bosnian	  polity	  would	  be	  more	  invested	  in	  regional	  politics	  than	  in	  politics	  at	  the	  
national	  level.	  As	  a	  means	  of	  further	  decentralizing	  the	  decision-­‐making	  capabilities	  
of	  the	  state-­‐level	  government,	  the	  accords	  established	  second-­‐level	  units	  of	  local	  
autonomy—“cantons”	  within	  the	  Federation,	  and	  “municipalities”	  within	  the	  
Republika	  Srpska.	  	  
The	  structure	  of	  the	  cantons	  emphasizes	  their	  political	  autonomy.	  The	  
cantons	  operate	  as	  mini-­‐states-­‐within-­‐states,	  each	  with	  their	  own	  carefully	  
established	  system	  of	  governance	  and	  distribution.	  Each	  canton	  has	  its	  own	  
assembly	  of	  twenty	  to	  thirty-­‐five	  delegates.	  Cantonal	  assembly	  chairpersons	  
nominate	  cantonal	  premiers,	  who	  in	  turn	  nominate	  their	  own	  ministers.	  Cantonal	  
governments	  are	  confirmed	  by	  a	  majority	  vote	  of	  the	  cantonal	  assemblies,	  while	  
municipal	  mayors	  and	  city	  councils	  are	  directly	  elected.31	  Interestingly,	  the	  political	  
institutions	  of	  the	  Republika	  Srpska	  are	  comparatively	  “much	  more	  centralized	  and	  
streamlined.”	  The	  Republic	  has	  a	  president,	  and	  a	  government	  headed	  by	  a	  prime	  
minister	  and	  sixteen	  ministries.	  The	  parliament	  has	  eighty-­‐three	  seats.	  Given	  the	  
large	  Serb	  majority—the	  Republic	  is	  considered	  a	  homeland	  for	  Serbs	  living	  in	  
                                                
31 International Crisis Group, “Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina”: 5. 
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Bosnia—there	  are	  few	  Croats	  and	  Bosniaks	  in	  positions	  of	  authority,	  except	  for	  
where	  such	  ethnic	  diversity	  is	  required	  by	  quotas.32	  
The	  drafters	  of	  the	  accords	  understood	  to	  some	  extent	  the	  effect	  that	  the	  
entities’	  influence	  would	  have	  on	  the	  functionality	  of	  Bosnia’s	  national	  government.	  
In	  order	  to	  establish	  a	  more	  functional	  government	  at	  the	  state-­‐level,	  the	  Bosnian	  
Constitution,	  outlined	  by	  the	  Dayton	  accords,	  established	  a	  multi-­‐tiered	  structure	  of	  
national	  political	  institutions:	  a	  three-­‐person	  presidency,	  a	  fifteen-­‐person	  upper	  
legislative	  chamber	  (House	  of	  Peoples),	  and	  a	  forty-­‐two-­‐person	  lower	  chamber	  
(House	  of	  Representatives);	  together,	  the	  two	  chambers	  make	  up	  the	  Parliamentary	  
assembly.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  give	  the	  three	  ethnic	  groups	  equal	  decision-­‐making	  
capabilities,	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  national	  governing	  bodies	  is,	  determined	  on	  the	  
basis	  of	  a	  “strict	  ethnic	  calculus.”33	  The	  presidency	  consists	  of	  one	  representative	  
from	  each	  of	  Bosnia’s	  three	  “constituent	  peoples,”34	  and	  deputy	  ministers	  are	  drawn	  
from	  a	  different	  constituent	  community	  than	  their	  ministers.	  The	  House	  of	  Peoples,	  
a	  much	  smaller	  institution,	  consists	  of	  five	  Bosniaks,	  five	  Croats,	  and	  five	  Serbs.	  The	  
House	  of	  Representatives	  is	  the	  one	  institution	  that	  allows	  for	  a	  more	  varied	  ethnic	  
membership	  as	  its	  members	  are	  elected	  directly	  from	  the	  territory	  that	  they	  
represent:	  two	  thirds	  are	  elected	  from	  the	  Federation,	  and	  one	  third	  from	  the	  
                                                
32 International Crisis Group, “Bosnia: What Does Republika Srpska Want?” Europe Report 214 (October 
6, 2011). 
33 International Crisis Group, “State Institutions Under Attack,”: 220. 
34 The Dayton Accords assign the status of “constituent people” only to Bosniaks, Serbs, and Croats—a 
label that affords the three ethnic groups equal collective rights. Even though the Bosniaks are the clear 
majority in the country, Croats and Serbs reject the “minority” label, which connotes non-constituent status. 
The lack of rights afforded to non-constituents has made it very difficult for other ethnic minorities, and 
children of inter-ethnic marriages to attain official recognition as citizens.  
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Republika	  Srpska.35	  Even	  at	  the	  state-­‐level,	  divisions	  within	  the	  government	  have	  
incapacitated	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina’s	  institutions.	  The	  country’s	  political	  makeup	  
facilitates	  political	  actors’	  inclination	  to	  base	  decisions	  off	  of	  the	  needs	  of	  their	  
particular	  ethnic	  group.	  This	  allows	  them	  to	  avoid	  considering	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  
country	  on	  the	  whole.	  	  
	  	  This	  use	  of	  a	  strict	  ethnic	  calculus	  in	  divvying	  up	  political	  positions,	  coupled	  
with	  the	  creation	  of	  power-­‐sharing	  state-­‐level	  institutions	  suggests	  that	  the	  drafters	  
of	  the	  accords	  were	  greatly	  influenced	  by	  the	  principles	  of	  consociationalism.36	  
Although	  these	  principles	  are	  based	  on	  an	  acceptance	  of	  ethnic	  pluralism,	  their	  
application	  to	  post-­‐conflict	  political	  systems	  has	  been	  blamed	  for	  any	  resulting	  
institutionalization	  of	  ethnic	  divisions.37	  The	  three-­‐way	  power-­‐sharing	  system	  was	  
implemented	  both	  to	  restrict	  any	  possible	  attempts	  on	  the	  part	  of	  Croat	  and	  Serb	  
nationalist	  elites	  to	  rally	  for	  partition,	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  each	  ethnic	  group	  would	  be	  
equally	  represented.	  However,	  this	  system	  has	  proved	  to	  be	  ineffective.	  Constituents	  
remain	  uninterested	  in	  supporting	  presidential	  candidates,	  in	  spite	  of	  their	  
categorization	  by	  ethnicity.	  
This	  ineffectiveness	  calls	  into	  question	  the	  entire	  ethnically	  divided	  nature	  of	  
the	  Bosnian	  state.	  The	  consociational	  structure	  of	  Bosnian	  politics—specifically	  the	  
power-­‐sharing	  system	  and	  the	  determining	  of	  positions	  based	  on	  an	  ethnic	  
                                                
35  Richard Caplan, “Assessing the Dayton Accord: The Structural Weaknesses of the General Framework 
Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, 11.2 (July, 2000): 220. 
36 The principle of consociationalism was developed by Arendt Lijphart as a means of resolving the 
Netherlands’ ethnic crisis in the early 1900s. The purpose of consociationalism is to encourage ethnically 
segmented societies to sustain or build democracy through power-sharing systems. Countries such as 
Lebanon, Nigeria, Belgium and Switzerland all have countries that operate on consociationalist principles.  
37 This critique of consociationalism can be attributed to Donald L. Horowitz, who argues that 
consociationalism can lead to the reification ethnic divisions, such as in Lebanon and Nigeria.  
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calculus—has	  successfully	  been	  implemented	  in	  other	  post-­‐conflict	  states,	  namely	  in	  
Switzerland,	  and	  the	  Netherlands,	  raising	  the	  question	  of	  why	  this	  model	  allowed	  
for	  the	  regrowth	  and	  reconstruction	  of	  these	  states,	  but	  failed	  to	  provide	  for	  similar	  
results	  in	  Bosnia.	  The	  answer	  lies	  in	  the	  considerable	  likelihood	  of	  another	  eruption	  
of	  violent	  ethnic	  conflict	  in	  Bosnia.	  At	  the	  time	  that	  the	  consociational	  arrangements	  
were	  made	  for	  Switzerland,	  and	  the	  Netherlands,	  the	  risk	  of	  another	  outbreak	  of	  
war	  for	  each	  was	  highly	  unlikely.	  This	  was	  due	  largely	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  resources	  
necessary	  to	  start	  another	  intra-­‐state	  conflict	  were	  much	  harder	  to	  come	  by	  during	  
the	  reconstruction	  processes	  of	  these	  two	  states.	  Simply	  put,	  these	  states	  could	  not	  
have	  afforded	  another	  eruption	  of	  violence.	  Bosnia,	  in	  contrast,	  had	  and	  continues	  to	  
have	  the	  resources	  and	  the	  military	  capacity	  necessary	  to	  support	  another	  violent	  
conflict.	  Additionally,	  it	  does	  not	  have	  the	  state	  capacity	  necessary	  to	  prevent	  such	  
an	  eruption.	  The	  importance	  of	  forging	  a	  cohesive	  national	  identity	  is	  magnified	  by	  
its	  potential	  ability	  to	  prevent	  a	  second	  devolution	  into	  violent	  conflict.	  
The	  fact	  that	  the	  governmental	  structure	  laid	  out	  by	  the	  Dayton	  Accords	  has	  
not	  allowed	  for	  the	  healthy	  growth	  of	  Bosnia’s	  state-­‐level	  institutions	  means	  that	  
Bosnia	  has	  not	  successfully	  transitioned	  into	  a	  fully	  functional	  state.	  The	  lack	  of	  
capacity	  endemic	  in	  Bosnia’s	  institutions	  has	  reflected	  on	  its	  rates	  of	  growth,	  as	  
evidenced	  by	  the	  following	  economic	  and	  political	  indicators.	  The	  first	  indicators	  
examined	  fall	  into	  the	  categories	  of	  the	  political	  and	  the	  economic	  and	  are	  
particularly	  suggestive	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  growth.	  	  
In	  2011,	  Bosnia’s	  overall	  unemployment	  rate	  was	  43.3%.	  The	  CIA	  World	  
Factbook	  ranks	  the	  unemployment	  rates	  of	  200	  countries,	  and	  places	  Bosnia	  close	  to	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the	  bottom—in	  188th	  place.38	  A	  comparison	  to	  Serbia’s	  unemployment	  rates	  
contextualizes	  this	  statistic,	  and	  suggests	  its	  gravity.	  Serbia’s	  unemployment	  rate	  
was	  23.6%	  as	  of	  2011—this	  is	  far	  more	  representative	  of	  the	  regional	  norm.	  
Tracking	  Bosnia’s	  unemployment	  rates	  over	  time	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  matters	  have	  
not	  improved	  since	  Dayton’s	  implementation.	  Between	  2000	  and	  2011,	  these	  rates	  
fluctuated	  steadily	  between	  35%	  and	  43.3%.	  There	  was	  no	  real	  pattern	  to	  these	  
fluctuations,	  and	  certainly	  no	  suggestion	  of	  improvement.39	  
The	  Heritage	  Foundation’s	  2012	  Index	  of	  Economic	  Freedom	  rates	  the	  overall	  
economic	  freedom	  of	  179	  countries.	  Bosnia’s	  overall	  economic	  freedom	  score	  for	  
2012	  was	  57.3.	  This	  ranking	  places	  Bosnia	  in	  the	  category	  of	  countries	  whose	  
economic	  status	  is	  “mostly	  unfree.”	  Bosnia	  ranks	  in	  thirty-­‐eighth	  place	  out	  of	  forty-­‐
three	  European	  countries,	  indicating	  that	  Bosnia’s	  performance	  is	  well	  below	  the	  
regional	  average.40	  Bosnia’s	  overall	  score	  is	  .2	  points	  worse	  than	  it	  was	  last	  year.	  
The	  index	  suggests	  that	  its	  performance	  deteriorated	  partly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  global	  
economic	  slowdown,	  and	  partly	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  problematically	  slow	  pace	  of	  
transition	  to	  open-­‐market	  politics.	  As	  per	  Woodward’s	  argument,	  explained	  in	  
Section	  3	  of	  this	  paper,	  this	  slow	  pace	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  Bosnia	  did	  
not	  transition	  into	  liberal	  European	  economic	  regimes	  early	  enough	  in	  its	  
                                                
38 Countries were ranked in descending order. The country that was in spot number 1 (Monaco) therefore 
has the lowest unemployment rate. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/rankorder/2129rank.html?countryName=Bosnia%20and%20Herzegovina&countryCode=bk&regi
onCode=eur&rank=188#bk 








reconstruction	  process.	  As	  a	  result,	  Bosnia’s	  capacity	  for	  steady	  transition	  has	  been	  
noticeably	  stunted.	  
The	  index	  also	  examines	  political	  indicators,	  and	  suggests	  that	  Bosnia’s	  
decentralized	  political	  structure	  is	  another	  reason	  for	  its	  low	  ranking.	  Bosnia’s	  two	  
entities	  have	  entirely	  different	  tax	  policies.	  This	  has	  resulted	  in	  confusing	  economic	  
discrepancies	  between	  the	  two	  entities,	  and	  has	  contributed	  significantly	  to	  the	  
entire	  country’s	  lack	  of	  economic	  growth.	  Another	  significant	  political	  problem	  
contributing	  to	  Bosnia’s	  lack	  of	  economic	  freedom	  are	  high	  levels	  of	  political	  
corruption	  that	  have	  plagued	  Bosnia	  since	  Dayton’s	  implementation.	  Widespread	  
corruption	  discourages	  production	  and	  contributes	  to	  Bosnia’s	  “worrisome”	  lack	  of	  
entrepreneurial	  activity.41	  Bosnia	  ranks	  thirty-­‐two	  out	  of	  one	  hundred	  for	  freedom	  
from	  corruption.42	  To	  contextualize	  Bosnia’s	  score:	  The	  Netherlands	  rank	  at	  88,	  
Slovenia	  at	  64,	  Montenegro	  at	  37,	  and	  Serbia	  at	  35.	  While	  Bosnia’s	  levels	  of	  
government	  corruption	  are	  not	  significantly	  lower	  than	  in	  neighboring	  countries,	  
they	  are	  significantly	  lower	  than	  those	  of	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  greater	  European	  
region.43	  	  
The	  issue	  of	  corruption	  correlates	  to	  the	  high	  levels	  of	  Bosnian	  government	  
expenditure,	  which	  totals	  half	  of	  the	  domestic	  output.	  These	  high	  levels	  result	  in	  
chronic	  budget	  deficits,	  and	  contribute	  to	  Bosnia’s	  ever-­‐growing	  public	  debt.	  
Corruption	  also	  reflects	  on	  Bosnia’s	  continuously	  weak	  rule	  of	  law—another	  sector	  
that	  was	  constructed	  by	  the	  accords.	  Local	  courts	  are	  constantly	  subject	  to	  political	  
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. A score of 100 denotes a country completely free from corruption. 




interference—cases	  are	  often	  affected	  by	  corrupt	  government	  officials’	  ability	  to	  
sway	  court	  decisions.	  The	  state-­‐level	  bureaucracy	  is,	  on	  the	  whole,	  intrusive	  and	  
affects	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  political	  activity.44	  	  
	   Bosnia	  performs	  much	  better	  in	  social	  indicators,	  such	  as	  education	  levels	  
and	  literacy	  rates.	  The	  school	  life	  expectancy	  of	  students	  in	  primary	  through	  tertiary	  
education	  is	  fourteen	  years.	  This	  places	  Bosnia	  only	  slightly	  below	  the	  United	  States	  
and	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  who	  both	  have	  sixteen	  years	  as	  the	  average	  school	  life	  
expectancy.	  There	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  current	  data	  about	  the	  primary	  school	  net	  enrollment	  
ratio	  in	  Bosnia,	  but	  between	  2007	  and	  2009,	  87%	  of	  the	  relevant	  population	  was	  
enrolled	  in	  primary	  school.45	  As	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  high	  school	  life	  expectancy,	  
Bosnia’s	  literacy	  rate	  is	  96.7%,	  only	  slightly	  below	  Slovenia,	  at	  99.7%,	  and	  well	  
above	  other	  post-­‐conflict	  countries	  such	  as	  Lebanon	  (87.4%),	  and	  Rwanda	  
(70.4%).46	  	  
Why	  are	  Bosnia’s	  social	  indicators	  more	  reflective	  of	  growth	  and	  institutional	  
stability?	  While	  it	  difficult	  to	  draw	  any	  substantive	  conclusions,	  the	  fact	  is	  that	  these	  
indicators	  reflect	  the	  capacity	  of	  sub-­‐state	  institutions,	  not	  the	  capacity	  of	  those	  at	  
the	  state-­‐level.	  Education	  is	  organized	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  Federation	  and	  the	  
Republic,	  and	  while	  Bosnia’s	  education	  system	  is	  plagued	  with	  other	  problems,	  
                                                
44 The Heritage Foundation 2012 Index of Economic Freedom, Bosnia-
Herzegovina.http://www.heritage.org/index/country/bosniaherzegovina 
45 UNICEF Country Statistics, Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/bosniaherzegovina_statistics.html 




these	  social	  indicators	  suggest	  that	  the	  entities’	  institutions	  indeed	  are	  more	  
functional	  and	  stable	  than	  state-­‐level	  institutions.47	  	  
Bosnia’s	  political	  and	  economic	  stability—as	  described	  by	  the	  indicators	  
analyzed	  above—suggests	  that	  lack	  of	  growth	  across	  all	  categories	  has	  been	  
consistent	  since	  Dayton’s	  implementation.	  This	  phenomenon	  highlights	  the	  effects	  
of	  Dayton’s	  two	  main	  problems,	  as	  described	  in	  the	  introduction	  of	  this	  paper:	  the	  
continued	  involvement	  of	  external	  actors	  in	  Bosnian	  affairs,	  and	  the	  decentralization	  
of	  the	  Bosnian	  state.	  In	  sum,	  an	  analysis	  of	  these	  indicators	  suggests	  that	  the	  state-­‐
level	  institutions	  created	  by	  the	  accords	  have	  failed	  to	  provide	  for	  a	  state	  capable	  of	  
self-­‐governance,	  and	  of	  significant	  growth	  over	  time;	  while	  the	  institutions	  created	  





















                                                
47 See Section Six of this paper for a discussion of the problems with Bosnia’s education system.  
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5.	  Two	  Models	  of	  Conflict	  Mediation	  and	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Reconstruction	  in	  
Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  
	  
5.1	  The	  United	  States’	  Model:	  Mediating	  the	  Conflict	  	  
	  
The	  Clinton	  administration’s	  actions	  during	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  can	  be	  analyzed	  
in	  two	  distinct	  timeframes:	  the	  mediation	  phase—the	  phase	  that	  took	  place	  before	  
the	  drafting	  of	  the	  Dayton	  Accords—and	  the	  reconstruction	  phase.	  In	  order	  to	  
understand	  Dayton’s	  failures,	  it	  is	  necessary	  first	  to	  analyze	  the	  former.	  This	  section	  
explains	  how	  the	  administration	  arrived	  at	  the	  drafting	  at	  the	  accords,	  and	  how	  it	  
provided	  for	  the	  actual	  cessation	  of	  hostilities—Dayton’s	  first	  goal.	  Once	  the	  
administration	  intervened,	  its	  mediation	  style	  was	  characterized	  by	  the	  promise	  of	  
serious	  military	  retaliation	  in	  the	  face	  of	  a	  continued	  Bosnian	  Serb	  offensive;	  by	  the	  
promise	  of	  the	  equal	  division	  of	  Bosnian	  territory	  if	  both	  sides	  agreed	  to	  
constructively	  negotiate	  for	  peace;	  and	  by	  assurances	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  
support	  during	  the	  reconstruction	  process.	  	  
President	  Clinton	  came	  into	  office	  during	  the	  second	  year	  of	  the	  conflict,	  
when	  levels	  of	  violence	  had	  just	  begun	  to	  increase.	  George	  H.	  W.	  Bush,	  his	  
predecessor,	  had	  not	  established	  measures	  for	  mediation	  or	  intervention	  prior	  to	  
the	  end	  of	  his	  term—thus,	  it	  was	  left	  to	  Clinton	  to	  develop	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  conflict.	  
During	  Clinton’s	  first	  years	  in	  office,	  when	  the	  conflict	  raged	  in	  full,	  his	  
administration	  continuously	  avowed	  that	  the	  war	  was	  the	  exclusive	  responsibility	  of	  
the	  Europeans.	  This	  belief	  derived	  from	  the	  idea	  that,	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  world,	  
without	  a	  looming	  threat	  of	  communism,	  European	  actors	  were	  finally	  ready	  to	  take	  
control	  of	  and	  to	  solve	  their	  own	  conflicts.	  In	  the	  interest	  of	  granting	  Europeans	  
autonomy	  over	  events	  on	  their	  continent,	  the	  administration	  was	  hesitant	  to	  commit	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American	  troops	  to	  ending	  the	  conflict.	  This	  lack	  of	  engagement	  became	  problematic	  
as	  the	  administration	  was	  soon	  faced	  with	  increased	  reports	  of	  human	  rights	  abuses	  
and	  crimes	  against	  humanity.48	  	  
	   The	  United	  States’	  initial	  involvement	  came	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Vance-­‐Owen	  
plan,	  a	  proposal	  negotiated	  by	  United	  Nations	  Special	  Envoy	  Cyrus	  Vance	  and	  the	  
European	  Community’s	  representative	  Lord	  David	  Owen	  that	  necessitated	  the	  
development	  of	  US	  troops	  to	  coerce	  acceptance	  of	  the	  plan	  through	  military	  
means.49	  The	  Clinton	  Administration	  rejected	  this	  plan,	  fearful	  that	  US	  public	  
opinion	  in	  the	  post-­‐Vietnam	  era	  would	  not	  support	  another	  prolonged	  deployment	  
of	  troops.	  Instead	  of	  providing	  support	  to	  the	  Vance-­‐Owen	  plan,	  Clinton’s	  
administration	  responded	  by	  unveiling	  its	  first	  Bosnian	  policy:	  the	  “lift	  and	  strike”.	  
This	  plan	  proposed	  the	  “lifting”	  of	  a	  previously	  implemented	  UN	  arms	  embargo,	  
working	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  embargo	  had	  operated	  unfairly	  against	  the	  
Bosnian	  Muslims,	  and	  had	  done	  little	  to	  prevent	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  from	  acquiring	  
weapons	  from	  the	  Serbian	  Republic.	  The	  “strike”	  would	  involve	  the	  launch	  of	  NATO-­‐
led	  air	  attacks	  in	  order	  to	  rigorously	  enforce	  UN-­‐no	  fly	  zones	  and	  to	  protect	  Bosnian	  
Muslims	  during	  the	  transitional	  period	  where	  they	  would	  still	  be	  vulnerable.	  The	  
successful	  implementation	  of	  this	  policy	  depended	  upon	  the	  cooperation	  of	  the	  UN,	  
NATO,	  and	  the	  allied	  European	  forces.	  	  
                                                
48 Some have even argued that Robert Kaplan’s book Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New 
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993) persuaded Clinton not to intervene in the conflict. This book argued that 
“ancient hatreds” guaranteed perpetual conflict in the Balkans, suggesting that intervention would be futile.  
49 The	  Vance-­‐Owen	  plan	  involved	  the	  division	  of	  Bosnia	  into	  ten	  semi-­‐autonomous	  units	  and	  was	  
predicated	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  United	  States,	  NATO,	  and	  the	  UN	  would,	  if	  necessary,	  deploy	  forces	  
to	  militarily	  coerce	  acceptance	  of	  the	  plan. 
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Ultimately,	  NATO,	  the	  UN,	  and	  the	  allied	  European	  forces	  rejected	  the	  “lift	  
and	  strike.”	  Warren	  Christopher,	  Clinton’s	  Secretary	  of	  State	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  
Bosnian	  War,	  who	  had	  been	  tasked	  with	  proposing	  the	  “lift	  and	  strike”	  to	  these	  
forces,	  announced	  that	  the	  allies	  would	  only	  be	  convinced	  by	  the	  “raw	  power	  
approach,”	  which	  necessitated	  announcing	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  go	  ahead	  
with	  the	  plan,	  regardless	  of	  the	  allies’	  support.	  This	  raw	  power	  approach	  was	  
quickly	  rejected	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  it	  would	  risk	  a	  “major	  confrontation	  with	  the	  
allies”	  and	  would	  leave	  sole	  responsibility	  for	  any	  failures	  that	  might	  ensue	  in	  
Bosnia	  with	  the	  US.50	  	  
Clinton’s	  refusal	  to	  commit	  to	  ending	  to	  ending	  the	  war	  for	  fear	  of	  eliciting	  a	  
negative	  public	  reaction	  was	  not	  met	  with	  unequivocal	  support	  from	  his	  
administration.	  As	  such,	  the	  administration’s	  failure	  to	  develop	  a	  comprehensive	  
policy	  had	  a	  great	  deal	  to	  do	  with	  its	  internally	  divided	  opinion	  on	  the	  form	  that	  
such	  a	  policy	  would	  take.	  As	  the	  administration	  continued	  to	  debate	  military	  and	  
diplomatic	  options,	  the	  situation	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  Bosnia	  dramatically	  deteriorated.	  
In	  late	  May,	  the	  Europeans	  called	  on	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Russia	  to	  provide	  troops	  
to	  protect	  six	  Muslim	  enclaves	  that	  the	  UN	  had	  declared	  “safe	  areas.”	  Despite	  
protection	  from	  UN	  troops,	  the	  European	  forces	  feared	  that	  the	  Bosnian	  Serb	  army	  
would	  target	  these	  enclaves.	  	  
This	  move	  highlighted	  the	  problems	  of	  “multilateralism,”	  a	  post-­‐World	  War	  II	  
policy	  of	  cooperation	  among	  several	  nations.	  This	  policy	  greatly	  complicated	  the	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decision-­‐making	  capacity	  of	  any	  single	  state.	  Whereas	  “unilateralism”—the	  policy	  
that	  allowed	  a	  single	  state	  to	  make	  decisions	  without	  consulting	  other	  states—
allowed	  for	  speedy	  decision-­‐making	  in	  times	  of	  crisis,	  multilateralism	  required	  
taking	  the	  often-­‐divergent	  goals	  of	  multiple	  nations	  into	  account.	  In	  further	  proof	  of	  
the	  downfalls	  of	  multilateralism,	  Washington	  chose	  to	  “firmly	  rebuff”	  this	  plan,	  with	  
Clinton	  “emphasizing	  that	  he	  would	  not	  send	  U.S.	  troops	  into	  ‘a	  shooting	  gallery’”51	  
This	  decision	  proved	  fatal—both	  to	  those	  living	  in	  the	  enclaves,	  and	  to	  the	  
reputation	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  Bosnian	  policy.	  
	  On	  July	  6,	  1995,	  the	  heavily	  Bosnian	  Muslim	  inhabited	  area	  of	  Srebrenica,	  
allegedly	  under	  the	  protection	  of	  400	  Dutch	  UNPROFOR	  troops,	  was	  attacked	  by	  
Bosnian	  Serb	  forces.	  52	  	  In	  the	  days	  that	  followed,	  Bosnian	  Serb	  troops	  massacred	  
over	  8,000	  Bosniak	  men	  and	  young	  boys.	  More	  than	  25,000	  women	  and	  children	  
were	  displaced	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  massacre—sent	  either	  to	  refugee	  camps,	  or	  to	  the	  
war’s	  infamous	  rape-­‐camps.	  Soon	  after	  the	  massacre,	  Bosnian	  Serb	  troops	  declared	  
that	  they	  would	  follow	  with	  a	  similar	  attack	  on	  the	  UN	  safe-­‐area	  of	  Gorazde.	  In	  
response	  to	  this	  new	  threat,	  NATO	  vowed	  to	  send	  a	  force	  into	  Bosnia	  in	  order	  to	  
prevent	  a	  second	  tragedy	  at	  Gorazde.	  The	  United	  States’	  openly	  stated	  commitment	  
to	  NATO	  meant	  that,	  in	  a	  show	  of	  solidarity,	  it	  finally	  had	  to	  commit	  its	  own	  troops	  
to	  ending	  the	  conflict.	  The	  Srebrenica	  massacre	  seemed	  to	  “hammer	  the	  near-­‐final	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nail	  in	  the	  coffin	  for	  the	  West’s	  Bosnia	  policy,”	  and	  highlighted	  for	  U.S.	  decision-­‐
makers	  the	  need	  to	  act	  immediately	  to	  end	  the	  violence.53	  	  
The	  administration’s	  meeting	  on	  August	  seventh	  was	  called	  in	  order	  discuss	  
the	  various	  policy	  options	  available	  for	  ending	  the	  conflict.	  Antony	  Lake,	  one	  of	  
Clinton’s	  chief	  foreign	  policy	  advisors,	  strongly	  urged	  a	  strategy	  that	  deployed	  
troops	  on	  the	  US’s	  terms,	  not	  the	  UN’s	  or	  NATO’s.	  It	  was	  however	  Madeleine	  
Albright’s	  (US	  ambassador	  to	  the	  UN	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  conflict)	  plan	  that	  eventually	  
won	  Clinton’s	  approval.	  Her	  plan	  involved	  pushing	  a	  peace	  initiative	  based	  on	  an	  
earlier	  recommendation	  that	  called	  for	  a	  51-­‐49%	  territorial	  split	  between	  the	  
Muslim-­‐Croat	  Federation	  and	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs.	  
	  In	  addition	  to	  seeking	  a	  cease-­‐fire,	  her	  proposal	  also	  involved	  the	  
development	  of	  a	  plan	  to	  build	  a	  viable,	  lasting	  peace	  in	  Bosnia	  through	  the	  assisted	  
reconstruction	  of	  local	  Bosnian	  institutions.	  Most	  importantly,	  Albright’s	  proposal	  
included	  the	  military	  and	  diplomatic	  muscle	  that	  had	  so	  long	  been	  missing	  from	  the	  
United	  States’	  policy.	  As	  a	  means	  of	  flexing	  this	  muscle,	  the	  administration	  pledged	  
to	  deploy	  20,000	  troops	  as	  part	  of	  NATO’s	  “Operation	  Deliberate	  Force”—an	  air	  
campaign	  intended	  to	  undermine	  the	  military	  capabilities	  of	  the	  Republika	  Srpska’s	  
army.	  This	  air	  strike	  was	  intended	  as	  a	  means	  of	  enforcing	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  United	  
States	  and	  NATO	  were	  firmly	  committed	  to	  the	  swift	  cessation	  of	  hostilities.	  	  
The	  one	  catch	  in	  the	  plan	  was	  that	  the	  United	  States	  would	  have	  to	  convince	  
the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Yugoslav	  Republics	  not	  only	  to	  agree	  to	  this	  solution,	  but	  also	  to	  
directly	  involve	  themselves	  in	  its	  creation.	  Thus,	  the	  next	  step	  for	  the	  Clinton	  
                                                




administration	  was	  to	  convince	  Yugoslav	  actors	  to	  participate	  directly	  in	  the	  official	  
creation	  of	  this	  plan.	  Richard	  Holbrooke	  was	  tasked	  with	  putting	  together	  a	  team	  to	  
fly	  to	  the	  region	  and	  to	  personally	  convince	  the	  Yugoslav	  leaders	  of	  the	  importance	  
of	  their	  participation.	  The	  official	  conference	  took	  place	  from	  November	  first	  to	  
November	  twenty-­‐first	  at	  the	  Wright-­‐Patterson	  air	  base	  in	  Dayton,	  Ohio.	  The	  
participants	  from	  the	  region	  were	  Serbian	  President	  Slobodan	  Milosevic,	  who	  stood	  
in	  for	  Bosnian	  Serb	  leader	  Karadzic;	  Croatian	  President	  Franjo	  Tudman;	  and	  
Bosnian	  President	  Alija	  Izetbegovic.	  The	  actors	  all	  entered	  the	  negotiations	  with	  
drastically	  different	  levels	  of	  commitment	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  a	  successfully	  
negotiated	  outcome.	  
The	  structure	  of	  the	  conference	  was	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  the	  United	  States’	  
creation	  of	  an	  initial	  blueprint	  of	  the	  accords.	  The	  United	  States	  had	  left	  no	  room	  for	  
the	  Yugoslav	  actors	  to	  participate	  in	  outlining	  the	  accords,	  or	  in	  filling	  in	  their	  
content.	  The	  Yugoslav	  participants	  were	  left	  only	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  debate	  the	  
details	  of	  the	  plan.	  Of	  course,	  the	  United	  States’	  prior	  commitment	  to	  the	  use	  of	  force	  
if	  the	  participants	  ultimately	  failed	  to	  conclude	  their	  negotiation	  made	  it	  inevitable	  
that	  Yugoslav	  actors	  would	  eventually	  sign	  of	  the	  accords,	  even	  if	  the	  Yugoslavs	  
found	  the	  accords	  to	  be	  imperfect.	  The	  United	  States	  and	  the	  other	  external	  actors	  
seemed	  of	  the	  opinion	  that,	  in	  order	  to	  secure	  decent	  domestic	  governance	  in	  
Bosnia,	  new	  institutional	  forms	  were	  required—forms	  that	  could	  potentially	  
compromise	  Westphalian	  sovereignty	  for	  an	  indefinite	  period	  of	  time.	  The	  United	  
States	  appeared	  inclined	  to	  opt	  for	  a	  shared	  sovereignty	  arrangement	  under	  which	  
“individuals	  chosen	  by	  international	  organizations,	  powerful	  states,	  or	  ad	  hoc	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entities	  would	  share	  authority	  with	  nationals	  over	  some	  aspects	  of	  domestic	  
sovereignty.”54	  	  
While	  the	  signatories	  of	  the	  Dayton	  Accords	  were	  allegedly	  committed	  to	  the	  
project	  of	  reconstructing	  the	  Bosnian	  state,	  the	  cessation	  of	  hostilities	  was	  the	  
primary	  goal	  of	  the	  negotiation	  conference.	  By	  the	  time	  the	  Dayton	  negotiations	  
took	  place,	  violence	  in	  the	  region	  had	  escalated	  such	  that	  that	  it	  threatened	  the	  
reputation	  of	  any	  involved	  external	  actor.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  Dayton	  conference	  
was	  to	  find	  a	  peaceful	  solution	  to	  the	  conflict	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible—both	  in	  order	  
to	  put	  a	  stop	  to	  the	  mass	  atrocities,	  and	  to	  reaffirm	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  these	  external	  
actors	  by	  preventing	  the	  conflict	  from	  expanding	  into	  areas	  and	  countries	  not	  yet	  
directly	  affected	  by	  the	  fighting.55	  The	  time	  sensitive	  nature	  of	  this	  task	  meant	  that	  
all	  other	  aspects	  of	  the	  negotiations	  and	  the	  accords	  were	  considered	  to	  be	  of	  
secondary	  importance.	  	  
For	  the	  reasons	  enumerated	  above,	  the	  first	  goal	  of	  the	  accords	  became	  the	  
negotiation	  of	  a	  “comprehensive	  settlement	  to	  bring	  an	  end	  to	  the	  tragic	  conflict	  in	  
the	  region,”	  to	  establish	  a	  durable	  cessation	  of	  hostilities,	  and	  accomplish	  this	  all	  as	  
swiftly	  as	  possible.56	  The	  Dayton	  Accords	  recognized	  what	  international	  actors	  had	  
stubbornly	  been	  ignoring	  since	  1992—that	  military	  involvement	  was	  necessary	  in	  
order	  to	  return	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  to	  a	  peaceful	  way	  of	  life.	  Furthermore,	  the	  
accords	  established	  that	  a	  major	  contribution	  was	  required	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	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Yugoslav	  republics—namely,	  that	  the	  accords	  required	  the	  cooperation	  of	  these	  
republics	  with	  the	  international	  organizations	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  
success.	  Mindful	  of	  this	  need	  for	  international	  assistance	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  
the	  accords,	  the	  signatories	  welcomed	  “the	  willingness	  of	  the	  international	  
community	  to	  send	  to	  the	  region,	  for	  a	  period	  of	  approximately	  one	  year,	  a	  force	  to	  
assist	  in	  implementation	  of	  the	  territorial	  and	  other	  militarily	  related	  provisions	  of	  
the	  agreement.”57	  The	  accords	  did	  not	  make	  any	  specifications	  as	  to	  what	  would	  
become	  of	  this	  force	  in	  the	  event	  that	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  accords	  was	  not	  
complete	  after	  one	  year.	  	  
Article	  II	  of	  the	  accords,	  titled	  simply,	  “Cessation	  of	  Hostilities,”	  outlined	  the	  
various	  provisions	  of	  the	  accords	  that	  were	  intended	  to	  lead	  to	  a	  complete	  cease-­‐
fire.	  These	  provisions	  established	  that	  the	  signatories	  of	  the	  accords	  (the	  Republic	  of	  
Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina,	  the	  Republic	  of	  Croatia,	  and	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  
Yugoslavia)	  were	  committed	  to	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  peace-­‐keeping	  actions	  including,	  
but	  not	  limited	  to,	  the	  maintenance	  of	  civilian	  law	  enforcement	  agencies	  that	  would	  
operate	  in	  accordance	  with	  internationally	  recognized	  standards;	  full	  cooperation	  
with	  international	  personnel;	  and	  the	  avowal	  to	  avoid	  committing	  any	  reprisals,	  
counterattacks,	  or	  unilateral	  actions	  in	  response	  to	  violations	  of	  the	  accords	  by	  
another	  party.	  In	  short:	  the	  accords	  represented	  an	  unbreakable	  promise	  by	  the	  
signatories	  to	  cease	  any	  and	  all	  hostilities	  immediately,	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  there	  
would	  be	  no	  further	  outbreaks	  of	  violence.	  
                                                




Dayton’s	  provisions	  included	  the	  assurance	  that	  this	  initial	  post-­‐negotiation	  
peacekeeping	  process	  would	  have	  some	  oversight,	  and	  that	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  
would	  have	  some	  military	  assistance	  even	  after	  the	  one-­‐year	  mark.	  This	  involved	  
the	  establishment	  of	  a	  multinational	  military	  Implementation	  Force	  (IFOR)	  
composed	  of	  “ground,	  air,	  and	  maritime	  unites	  from	  NATO	  and	  non-­‐NATO	  
nations.”58	  This	  force	  was	  tasked	  with	  promoting	  permanent	  reconciliation	  between	  
all	  Yugoslavian	  actors,	  and	  with	  establishing	  lasting	  security	  and	  arms	  control	  
measures.	  Though	  the	  IFOR	  was	  given	  unimpeded	  authority	  over	  the	  monitoring	  of	  
any	  suspected	  military	  activity	  in	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina,	  not	  all	  peace-­‐making	  
responsibilities	  were	  given	  to	  international	  actors.	  The	  accords	  also	  tasked	  the	  
Parties	  with	  the	  provision	  of	  a	  safe	  environment	  for	  all	  people	  in	  the	  republics,	  and	  
with	  the	  disarmament	  of	  all	  armed	  civilian	  groups	  (except	  for	  authorized	  police	  
forces)	  within	  30	  days	  after	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  accords.	  59	  60	  	  
These	  provisions	  of	  the	  Dayton	  Accords	  can	  be	  attributed	  in	  part	  to	  the	  fact	  
that,	  in	  drafting	  the	  accords,	  the	  Clinton	  administration	  implemented	  a	  new	  and	  
distinct	  approach	  to	  the	  traditional	  strategy	  of	  conflict	  resolution.	  In	  the	  past,	  the	  
success	  or	  failure	  of	  peace	  negotiations	  depended	  on	  “whether	  a	  particular	  conflict	  
was	  ripe	  for	  resolution.”	  In	  this	  traditional	  strategy,	  the	  shared	  perception	  of	  the	  
conflicting	  parties	  that	  a	  negotiated	  agreement	  was	  desirable	  acted	  as	  the	  
determinant	  for	  this	  “ripeness.”	  Dayton	  differed	  from	  this	  negotiating	  strategy	  in	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that	  its	  negotiations,	  and	  its	  reconstruction	  framework,	  were	  enacted	  on	  a	  timetable	  
convenient	  only	  to	  the	  United	  States.	  Thus,	  the	  decision-­‐making	  process	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  
which	  provisions	  would	  actually	  be	  included	  in	  the	  Dayton	  structure	  was	  rushed	  
and	  poorly	  thought	  out.	  	  
	   The	  effects	  of	  the	  administration’s	  mindset	  soon	  became	  glaringly	  obvious.	  It	  
did	  not	  take	  long	  for	  local	  and	  external	  actors	  to	  realize	  that	  the	  implementation	  
structure	  was	  dangerously	  decentralized	  and	  effectively	  ensured	  that	  
“responsibility	  and	  authority	  would	  rest	  with	  no	  single	  individual	  or	  institution.”61	  
As	  such,	  it	  appeared	  that	  the	  implementation	  suffered	  from	  an	  “enforcement	  gap.”	  
Bosnian	  political	  parties	  failed	  to	  reach	  a	  consensus	  on	  core	  post-­‐conflict	  issues,	  
thus	  necessitating	  the	  decision-­‐making	  assistance	  of	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  international	  
institutions.	  Although	  post-­‐Dayton	  Bosnia	  played	  host	  to	  fewer	  agencies	  than	  it	  had	  
during	  the	  days	  of	  United	  Nations	  rule,	  Dayton	  allowed	  far	  too	  many	  to	  remain	  
involved	  in	  the	  process,	  including	  but	  not	  limited	  to	  NATO,	  the	  UN,	  the	  UNHCR,	  the	  
OSCE,	  the	  EU,	  the	  World	  Bank,	  the	  IMF.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  decentralized	  nature	  of	  
Dayton’s	  implementation,	  it	  was	  clear	  by	  the	  middle	  of	  1996	  that	  this	  first	  promise	  
of	  the	  Dayton	  Accords—the	  cease-­‐fire,	  cessation	  of	  hostilities,	  and	  separation	  of	  
forces—had	  been	  “a	  resounding	  success.”62	  However,	  the	  accords’	  second	  goal,	  the	  
successful	  reconstruction	  of	  Bosnia’s	  economic	  and	  political	  institutions,	  proved	  far	  
more	  difficult	  to	  meet.	  	  
                                                
61 See Richard Holbrooke’s To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998). 
62 Hearing Before the Select Committee on Intelligence of the United States Senate One Hundred Fourth 
Congress; Second Session on the Dayton Accords, Wednesday July 24, 1996 (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1996): 26. 
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The	  crux	  of	  this	  second	  goal	  lay	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  intended	  to	  establish	  a	  
situation	  on	  the	  ground	  that	  would	  allow	  external	  actors	  to	  make	  a	  timely	  exit	  from	  
Bosnia.	  However,	  the	  accords	  had	  established	  international	  organizations,	  such	  as	  
the	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Representative	  for	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina,	  tasked	  with	  
overseeing	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  accords,	  thereby	  ensuring	  that	  external	  actors	  
would	  necessarily	  remained	  involved	  in	  the	  reconstruction	  process.	  Thus,	  even	  
though	  the	  accords	  did	  manage	  to	  design	  and	  create	  new	  institutions	  for	  Bosnia,	  the	  
growth	  of	  these	  institutions	  was	  stunted	  by	  their	  overreliance	  on	  external	  actors.	  
This	  added	  both	  to	  the	  widely	  held	  perception	  that	  the	  Bosnian	  state	  was	  not	  
legitimate,	  and	  worked	  to	  limit	  public	  interest	  in	  political	  participation—suggesting	  















5.2	  The	  United	  States’	  Model:	  Dayton’s	  Promises	  for	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Reconstruction	  
The	  parties	  agree	  that	  the	  establishment	  of	  progressive	  measures	  for	  regional	  stability	  
and	  arms	  control	  is	  essential	  to	  creating	  a	  stable	  peace	  in	  the	  region.	  To	  this	  end,	  they	  
agree	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  devising	  new	  forms	  of	  cooperation	  in	  the	  field	  of	  security	  
aimed	  at	  building	  transparency	  and	  confidence	  and	  achieving	  balanced	  and	  stable	  
defense	  force	  levels	  at	  the	  lowest	  numbers	  consistent	  with	  the	  Parties’	  respective	  
security	  and	  the	  need	  to	  avoid	  an	  arms	  race	  in	  the	  region.	  They	  have	  approved	  the	  
following	  elements	  for	  a	  regional	  structure	  for	  stability.”63	  
	  
In	  attempting	  to	  provide	  for	  Bosnia’s	  reconstruction,	  the	  entire	  second	  half	  of	  
the	  accords	  was	  devoted	  to	  outlining	  the	  structure	  of	  Bosnia’s	  political	  system.	  In	  
analyzing	  this	  section	  of	  the	  accords,	  we	  can	  determine	  the	  Clinton	  administration’s	  
actual	  model	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction.	  The	  independent	  variable	  of	  this	  model	  
is	  the	  actual	  cessation	  of	  hostilities—the	  bringing	  of	  peace	  to	  Bosnia.	  The	  model’s	  
dependent	  variables	  are	  peacebuilding	  (providing	  for	  lasting	  peace	  in	  Bosnia),	  and	  
statebuilding	  (the	  building	  and	  strengthening	  of	  state	  institutions).	  These	  
dependent	  variables	  provided	  for	  the	  actual	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  country.	  These	  
variables	  also	  ultimately	  failed	  to	  stabilize	  and	  rebuild	  the	  country	  [see	  appendix	  II].	  
The	  accords’	  provisions	  for	  peacebuilding,	  the	  first	  dependent	  variable,	  
included	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  UN	  International	  Police	  Task	  Force	  (IPTF).	  The	  
IPTF’s	  role	  was	  to	  maintain	  peace	  on	  the	  ground,	  and	  to	  ensure	  that	  civilian	  police	  
forces	  remained	  in	  line	  with	  international	  standards.64	  The	  accords	  also	  established	  
the	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Representative	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  accords	  would	  be	  
implemented	  peacefully	  and	  successfully.	  The	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Representative	  was	  
given	  the	  power	  to	  facilitate	  any	  difficulties	  that	  arose	  in	  implementing	  the	  accords.	  
                                                
63 The Dayton Peace Accords Annex 1B: Regional Stabilization, Article 1. 
http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/dayton/52579.htm 




The	  implementation	  process	  entailed	  a	  particularly	  wide	  range	  of	  activities,	  
including	  a	  “continuation	  of	  the	  humanitarian	  aid	  effort	  for	  as	  long	  as	  necessary;	  
rehabilitation	  of	  infrastructure	  and	  economic	  reconstruction;	  the	  establishment	  of	  
political	  and	  constitutional	  institutions	  in	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina;	  promotion	  of	  
respect	  for	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  return	  of	  displaced	  persons	  and	  refugees’,	  and	  the	  
holding	  of	  free	  and	  fair	  elections.”65	  	  
The	  problem	  with	  the	  accords’	  provisions	  for	  peacebuilding	  is	  that	  they	  were	  
overly	  reliant	  on	  the	  assistance	  of	  external	  actors.	  While	  the	  OHR	  was	  helpful	  in	  
kick-­‐starting	  the	  process	  of	  political,	  social,	  and	  economic	  reconstruction	  in	  Bosnia-­‐
Herzegovina,	  it	  soon	  became	  a	  crutch	  upon	  which	  the	  state’s	  weak	  political	  
institutions	  could	  lean	  for	  assistance.	  To	  this	  day,	  the	  OHR	  has	  had	  to	  step	  in	  
countless	  times	  to	  impose	  policy	  decisions	  where	  Bosnia’s	  national	  political	  
institutions	  have	  proved	  incapable	  of	  doing	  so	  on	  their	  own.	  That	  such	  a	  powerful	  
crutch	  has	  existed	  for	  upward	  of	  15	  years	  has	  meant	  that	  Bosnian	  state-­‐level	  
institutions	  have	  had	  little	  incentive	  to	  govern	  autonomously,	  and	  have	  failed	  to	  
prove	  themselves	  as	  functional	  and	  capable	  of	  legitimate	  governance.	  	  
The	  signatories	  of	  the	  Dayton	  Accords	  was	  vocally	  dedicated	  to	  establishing	  
Bosnia	  as	  a	  state	  based	  on	  “democratic	  governmental	  institutions	  and	  fair	  
procedures,”	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  producing	  “peaceful	  relations	  within	  a	  pluralist	  
society.”	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  main	  purpose	  of	  the	  accords	  was	  to	  assist	  the	  
Bosnian	  state	  in	  regaining	  acceptable	  levels	  of	  political	  legitimacy	  through	  measures	  
                                                




to	  assist	  the	  transitional	  administration.66	  Dayton’s	  peacebuilding	  operation	  initially	  
seemed	  in	  line	  with	  what	  Rubin	  defined	  as	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  of	  peacebuilding	  
operations:	  assisting	  the	  transitioning	  state	  in	  its	  attempts	  to	  legitimize	  their	  state	  
power.	  However,	  the	  OHR’s	  power	  and	  influence	  extended	  far	  beyond	  the	  point	  
where	  it	  actually	  lent	  necessary	  assistance	  for	  Bosnia’s	  transition.	  The	  OHR,	  and	  
other	  international	  organizations	  and	  institutions	  that	  remained	  behind	  in	  Bosnia	  
have	  failed	  to	  provide	  the	  resources	  necessary	  to	  actually	  build	  national	  capacity	  for	  
security	  and	  legitimate	  governance.67	  
In	  providing	  for	  statebuilding,	  the	  second	  dependent	  variables,	  the	  accords	  
laid	  the	  framework	  for	  elections	  and	  arbitration	  in	  Bosnian,	  outlined	  the	  
Constitution,	  and	  restructured	  Bosnia’s	  political	  system—these	  measures	  are	  
described	  in	  full	  detail	  in	  Section	  4	  of	  this	  paper.68	  The	  Constitution	  established	  the	  
power-­‐sharing	  presidency,	  and	  decided	  upon	  the	  precise	  structure	  of	  the	  House	  of	  
People	  and	  the	  House	  of	  Representatives.	  In	  addition	  to	  outlining	  a	  detailed	  plan	  for	  
the	  structure	  of	  Bosnia’s	  national	  government,	  the	  agreement	  officially	  recognized	  
the	  Republika	  Srpska	  as	  one	  of	  two	  semi-­‐autonomous	  entities	  within	  Bosnia-­‐
Herzegovina	  (the	  other,	  the	  Federation	  of	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina).	  	  
Dayton’s	  acceptance	  and	  recognition	  of	  the	  Republika	  Srpska	  as	  an	  
autonomous	  entity	  came	  as	  a	  heavy	  blow	  to	  the	  Bosniaks,	  who	  had	  expected	  the	  
international	  community	  to	  punish	  Serb	  wartime	  atrocities	  by	  reincorporating	  the	  
Bosnian	  Serbs	  into	  a	  highly	  centralized	  state—a	  plan	  that	  would	  have	  put	  the	  
                                                
66 The Dayton Peace Accords, Annex 4, Preamble. 
http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/bosagree.html 
67 Rubin, “The Politics of Security in Postconflict Statebuilding”: 34. 
68 The Dayton Accords, Annex 4. 
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Bosniaks	  at	  the	  forefront	  of	  state-­‐level	  politics.69	  This	  hope	  of	  centralization	  was	  not	  
realized.	  Ultimately,	  much	  of	  Bosnia’s	  governance	  takes	  place	  from	  within	  these	  two	  
autonomous	  entities—not,	  in	  fact,	  at	  the	  state-­‐level.	  Dayton’s	  creation	  of	  the	  canton	  
and	  municipality	  structure	  within	  these	  entities	  only	  served	  to	  further	  decentralize	  
the	  state.	  	  
Here,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  pinpoint	  the	  three	  main	  problems	  with	  the	  
administration’s	  model.	  Firstly,	  the	  model	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  
state	  that	  was	  overwhelmingly	  decentralized,	  and	  organized	  around	  ethnic,	  as	  
opposed	  to	  state,	  politics.	  This	  first	  problem	  has	  had	  significant	  implications	  on	  
levels	  of	  participation	  in	  Bosnian	  state-­‐level	  politics.	  The	  second	  problem	  was	  that	  
the	  accords’	  provisions	  for	  peacebuilding,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  establishment	  of	  the	  OHR,	  
entrenched	  the	  need	  for	  the	  international	  community’s	  oversight	  in	  all	  facets	  of	  the	  
reconstruction	  process.	  This	  effectively	  ensured	  that	  state	  institutions	  in	  Bosnia	  
would	  not	  experience	  appropriate	  levels	  of	  growth.	  Finally,	  Clinton’s	  model	  did	  not	  
make	  any	  provisions	  for	  nation	  building.	  This	  has	  ensured	  that	  Bosnian	  citizens	  feel	  
no	  connection	  to	  their	  state.	  Thus,	  they	  remain	  un-­‐invested	  and	  uninterested	  in	  its	  
development.	  	  
The	  Clinton	  administration’s	  reconstruction	  model	  did	  not	  take	  into	  account	  
variables	  that	  would	  have	  allowed	  for	  the	  regrowth	  of	  civil	  society	  in	  conjunction	  
with	  the	  regrowth	  of	  political	  institutions.	  Had	  Bosnia’s	  reconstruction	  model	  
incorporated	  nation	  building,	  this	  would	  have	  mobilized	  the	  population	  behind	  the	  
country’s	  parallel	  process	  of	  statebuilding,	  and	  would	  have	  increased	  public	  interest	  
                                                
69 International Crisis Group, “Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina—A Parallel Crisis,” Europe Report 
209 (September 28, 2010): 2l. 
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in	  ensuring	  the	  functionality	  of	  political	  institutions.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  three	  
variables	  that	  I	  have	  identified—education,	  citizenship,	  and	  political	  participation—
is	  that	  they	  would	  have	  allowed	  for	  this	  regrowth	  of	  civil	  society,	  and	  would	  have	  








































5.3	  Burg:	  A	  Critique	  of	  the	  Clinton	  Administration’s	  Model	  
	  
The	  model	  for	  conflict	  mediation	  that	  Burg	  proposes	  is	  in	  direct	  response	  to	  
his	  perception	  of	  the	  flaws	  in	  the	  United	  States’	  and	  the	  international	  community’s	  
Bosnian	  policy.	  Burg’s	  argument,	  and	  his	  proposal	  for	  alternate	  tactics	  of	  conflict	  
mediation	  fill	  in	  some	  crucial	  gaps	  in	  the	  Clinton	  Administration’s	  process.	  However,	  
I	  hold	  that	  his	  model	  does	  not	  go	  quite	  far	  enough.	  The	  importance	  of	  Burg’s	  model	  
for	  my	  paper	  is	  two-­‐fold:	  firstly,	  I	  use	  Burg’s	  model	  to	  show	  that,	  while	  alternate	  
models	  have	  been	  proposed,	  they	  still	  have	  not	  managed	  to	  correctly	  identify	  the	  
variables	  that	  are	  most	  important	  in	  conflict	  mediation	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  
reconstruction	  processes.	  Secondly,	  Burg’s	  assertions	  about	  using	  carrots	  as	  well	  as	  
sticks,	  and	  of	  giving	  local	  actors	  autonomy	  in	  the	  crafting	  of	  solutions	  to	  conflict,	  
could	  be	  applied	  in	  other	  ways,	  such	  as	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  European	  Union	  
membership.	  This	  possibility	  will	  be	  explained	  in	  detail	  this	  later	  in	  the	  section.	  	  
For	  the	  sake	  of	  clarification:	  here,	  Burg	  writes	  about	  the	  period	  before	  the	  
official	  dissolution	  of	  Yugoslavia.	  Thus,	  any	  mention	  of	  “local	  actors”	  refers	  to	  the	  
leaders	  of	  the	  Yugoslav	  republics	  (notably:	  Milsosevic,	  President	  of	  the	  Federal	  
Republic	  of	  Yugoslavia;	  Tudman,	  President	  of	  Croatia;	  and	  Izetbegovic,	  President	  of	  
Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina),	  not	  to	  actors	  within	  the	  entities	  of	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina.	  	  
Burg’s	  model	  for	  conflict	  mediation	  relies	  on	  the	  involvement	  of	  local	  actors	  
as	  its	  independent	  variable.	  The	  model’s	  dependent	  variables	  are	  a	  credible	  threat	  of	  
force,	  coupled	  with	  the	  offering	  of	  significant	  positive	  incentives	  and	  common	  
positive	  inducements	  to	  the	  actors	  in	  the	  conflict	  [See	  Appendix	  II].	  Simply	  put,	  his	  
model	  takes	  a	  standard	  “carrot	  and	  stick”	  approach	  to	  conflict	  mediation.	  Burg	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suggests	  that	  international	  actors	  should	  have	  involved	  themselves	  in	  the	  conflict	  
only	  in	  so	  far	  as	  they	  could	  induce	  local	  actors	  to	  find	  solutions	  on	  their	  own.	  
International	  actors	  in	  the	  Bosnian	  failed	  to	  immediately	  recognize	  the	  power	  of	  a	  
carrot	  and	  stick	  approach	  in	  time	  to	  have	  allowed	  for	  a	  conflict-­‐mediation	  and	  
reconstruction	  process	  led	  exclusively	  by	  local	  Yugoslav	  actors.	  	  
Burg	  builds	  mostly	  off	  of	  the	  mistakes	  that	  he	  believes	  the	  Clinton	  
administration,	  international	  organizations,	  and	  European	  made	  in	  handling	  the	  
Bosnian	  conflict.	  Burg	  takes	  issue	  mostly	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  initial	  response	  of	  
external	  actors	  was	  not	  to	  find	  a	  way	  to	  assist	  the	  Yugoslav	  actors	  in	  crafting	  their	  
own	  solution	  to	  the	  problem.	  Burg	  suggests	  that	  the	  most	  practical	  approach	  was	  
one	  that	  linked	  the	  prospect	  of	  European	  recognition	  to	  the	  negotiation	  of	  a	  peace	  
comprehensive	  settlement.	  This	  approach,	  a	  “carrot	  and	  stick”	  type	  approach,	  views	  
recognition	  as	  the	  one	  possible	  reward	  that	  would	  have	  appealed	  to	  all	  of	  the	  actors,	  
and	  views	  the	  use	  of	  military	  force	  as	  the	  one	  “stick”	  that	  would	  have	  sufficiently	  
worried	  these	  actors.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  mediation	  in	  Bosnia	  was	  especially	  complicated	  
due	  to	  the	  precise	  structure	  of	  the	  conflict—specifically,	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  was	  both	  an	  
internal	  struggle	  among	  nationalist	  parties	  with	  mutually	  exclusive	  territorial	  and	  
political	  goals,	  and	  an	  international	  conflict	  between	  the	  Bosnian,	  Serbian,	  and	  Croat	  
Republics.	  This	  made	  it	  especially	  difficult	  for	  international	  mediators	  to	  know	  when	  
and	  how	  to	  intervene,	  and	  with	  which	  parties	  to	  negotiate.70	  Nevertheless,	  the	  
external	  mediators’	  inability	  to	  gauge	  the	  appropriate	  means	  of	  intervention	  had	  a	  
                                                
70 Burg, “Intractability and Third-Party Mediation in the Balkans,”: 197. 
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detrimental	  impact	  on	  Bosnia’s	  ability	  to	  successfully	  rebuild	  itself.	  External	  actors	  
set	  up	  a	  pattern	  of	  involvement	  that	  made	  it	  almost	  impossible	  for	  them	  to	  easily	  
extract	  themselves	  from	  the	  process.	  	  
Burg,	  like	  Rubin,	  acknowledges	  the	  potential	  benefit	  of	  external	  involvement	  
in	  peacebuilding	  and	  statebuilding	  processes,	  but	  only	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  
involvement	  is	  intended	  to	  assist	  and	  speed	  up	  the	  local	  governments’	  ability	  to	  gain	  
legitimacy	  and	  to	  begin	  the	  process	  of	  political	  reconstruction.	  Implicit	  in	  Burg’s	  
argument	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  external	  actors	  should	  not	  blindly	  intervene	  in	  the	  
affairs	  of	  other	  states.71	  While	  Burg	  never	  explicitly	  links	  his	  argument	  to	  
sovereignty	  theory,	  it	  seems	  clear	  that	  he	  agrees	  with	  the	  fundamental	  assumption	  
of	  Westphalian	  and	  Vatellian	  sovereignty:	  that	  states	  should	  be	  free	  from	  
intervention	  on	  the	  part	  of	  other	  states.	  Excessive	  levels	  of	  intervention	  are	  
ineffective	  in	  processes	  of	  conflict	  resolution,	  and	  in	  any	  ensuing	  attempts	  at	  post-­‐
conflict	  reconstruction.	  	  
Burg’s	  understanding	  of	  Dayton’s	  failures	  hinges	  on	  mistakes	  that	  were	  made	  
long	  before	  the	  United	  States’	  initial	  involvement	  in	  the	  conflict.	  He	  posits	  that	  that	  
the	  international	  community’s	  initial	  involvement	  established	  a	  need	  for	  the	  
involvement	  of	  external	  actors	  in	  the	  post-­‐conflict	  process.	  Burg	  argues	  that	  there	  
were	  clear	  points	  in	  time	  where	  the	  international	  community	  could	  have	  handed	  
decision-­‐making	  power	  to	  the	  Yugoslav	  actors	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  they	  had	  the	  
                                                
71 See Stephen L. Burg, “Intractability and Third-Party Mediation in the Balkans,” in Grasping the Nettle: 
Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, ed. Crocker, Chester A. (Endowment of the United States Institute 
of Peace, 2005). 
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capacity	  both	  to	  solve	  their	  own	  problems,	  and	  to	  address	  the	  needs	  of	  their	  would-­‐
be	  constituents.	  	  
Given	  the	  international	  community’s	  failure	  to	  rely	  on	  the	  model’s	  
independent	  variable,	  Burg	  argues	  next	  for	  the	  use	  of	  positive	  inducements,	  or	  
“carrots,”	  Burg	  posits	  that	  there	  was	  “only	  one	  goal	  under	  the	  control	  of	  the	  
international	  community	  that	  was	  sufficiently	  important	  to	  each	  of	  the	  regional	  
leaders	  to	  constitute	  a	  positive	  inducement,”	  and	  that	  this	  goal	  was	  official	  
recognition	  by	  the	  West.72	  According	  to	  Izetbegovic,	  Bosnia	  considered	  itself	  as	  “a	  
European	  country”	  whose	  people	  were	  “European	  people.”73	  Thus,	  the	  possibility	  of	  
integration	  into	  the	  wider	  European	  community	  was	  particularly	  enticing.	  Given	  
this,	  Burg	  posits	  that	  the	  international	  community	  should	  have	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  
recognition	  would	  be	  granted	  only	  to	  all	  of	  the	  Yugoslav	  regions	  simultaneously	  or	  
to	  none	  of	  them	  at	  all—and	  then	  only	  in	  response	  to	  their	  peaceful	  settlement	  of	  all	  
their	  disputes.	  This	  would	  have	  ensured	  the	  achievement	  of	  a	  non-­‐zero-­‐sum	  
outcome	  to	  the	  conflict.	  	  
However,	  European	  actors	  failed	  to	  embrace	  this	  carrot	  and	  stick	  approach	  in	  
a	  timely	  fashion.	  Once	  the	  opportunity	  to	  successfully	  use	  a	  “carrot”	  to	  induce	  
cooperation	  amongst	  the	  Yugoslav	  actors	  passed,	  the	  importance	  of	  using	  a	  “stick”	  
to	  actually	  end	  the	  violence	  was	  magnified.	  Burg’s	  critique	  of	  the	  United	  States’	  
approach	  to	  mediation	  was	  that	  involved	  a	  “lack	  of	  engagement	  and	  the	  concomitant	  
absence	  of	  a	  credible	  threat	  of	  force.”74	  This	  meant	  both	  that	  Yugoslav	  actors	  did	  not	  
                                                
72 Burg, “Intractability and Third-Party Mediation in the Balkans”: 195. 
73 The International Conference on Yugoslavia: London Session. 
74 Burg, “Intractability in the Balkans”: 198. 
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believe	  that	  the	  United	  States	  was	  serious	  about	  ending	  the	  war,	  and	  that	  the	  job	  of	  
the	  external	  mediators	  was	  made	  more	  difficult	  because	  they	  had	  no	  “stick”	  with	  
which	  to	  threaten	  the	  Yugoslavs.	  	  
The	  United	  State’s	  ultimate	  decision	  to	  employ	  a	  strategy	  of	  coercive	  
diplomacy	  was	  successful	  in	  that	  it	  acted	  as	  a	  powerful	  enough	  stick	  to	  end	  the	  
fighting	  in	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina.75	  However,	  their	  use	  of	  coercive	  diplomacy	  was	  not	  
strong	  enough	  to	  get	  to	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  conflict.	  The	  institutions	  that	  were	  created	  at	  
Dayton	  did	  not	  include	  input	  from	  lower	  level	  local	  actors.	  As	  such,	  they	  did	  not	  
successfully	  resolve	  what	  Burg	  refers	  to	  as	  the	  “fundamental	  existential	  conflict”	  
between	  the	  groups.	  Indeed,	  these	  institutions	  left	  power	  and	  decision	  making	  
abilities	  divided	  between	  the	  three	  major	  ethnic	  groups	  and	  between	  the	  central	  
state	  and	  its	  constituencies	  (the	  Federation	  and	  the	  Serb	  Republic)	  and	  the	  lower	  
units	  (cantons	  and	  sub-­‐cantonal	  local	  governments).76	  	  	  
What	  Burg	  suggests,	  but	  does	  not	  fully	  flesh	  out,	  is	  the	  idea	  that,	  had	  the	  
international	  community	  successfully	  allowed	  Yugoslav	  actors	  to	  mediate	  their	  own	  
conflict,	  these	  actors	  would	  have	  had	  to	  create	  their	  own	  post-­‐conflict	  
reconstruction	  strategy.	  This	  would	  have	  involved	  a	  locally	  initiated	  attempt	  at	  
creating	  a	  functional	  system	  of	  governance—one	  that	  took	  all	  of	  the	  idiosyncrasies	  
of	  this	  particular	  ethnic	  conflict	  into	  account.	  Such	  a	  process	  would	  have	  had	  a	  
noticeable	  effect	  in	  the	  Bosnian	  case,	  where	  the	  Dayton	  Accords’	  strategy	  for	  post-­‐
conflict	  reconstruction	  was	  fueled	  in	  large	  part	  by	  the	  agendas	  of	  international	  
                                                
75 “Coercive diplomacy” is defined as a diplomatic strategy that relies on the threat of force rather than the 
use of force. The United States and Coercive Diplomacy, ed. Robert J. Art, Patrick M. Cronin (Washington, 
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mediators.	  If	  the	  Bosnians	  had	  been	  left	  to	  decide	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  their	  own	  
government	  without	  the	  crutch	  of	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  High	  Representative,	  their	  
political	  system	  would	  likely	  be	  considerably	  less	  frozen,	  dysfunctional,	  and	  mired	  
in	  lack	  of	  reform	  than	  it	  is	  today.	  	  
In	  analyzing	  Burg,	  I	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  proposal	  for	  the	  use	  of	  a	  
“carrot	  and	  stick”	  framework	  would	  have	  necessitated	  application	  long	  before	  the	  
first	  shots	  were	  fired—before	  the	  mediation	  process	  even	  began.	  As	  my	  focus	  is	  on	  
post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction,	  not	  mediation,	  the	  importance	  of	  Burg’s	  model	  lies	  in	  
its	  implications	  on	  actions	  that	  could	  have	  been	  taken	  later	  in	  the	  process.	  When	  
Burg	  was	  writing,	  in	  2005,	  the	  European	  Union	  had	  successfully	  integrated	  many	  
post-­‐conflict	  and	  post-­‐communist	  states.	  The	  EU	  could	  have	  made	  up	  for	  its	  earlier	  
mistakes	  in	  Bosnia	  by	  holding	  out	  EU	  membership	  as	  a	  carrot	  during	  the	  
reconstruction	  phase.	  This	  could	  have	  been	  done	  according	  to	  Burg’s	  guidelines:	  the	  
EU	  could	  have	  set	  the	  general	  parameters	  and	  goals	  that	  it	  required	  Bosnia	  to	  meet	  
for	  membership,	  but	  could	  have	  let	  the	  local	  actors	  decide	  how	  to	  actually	  meet	  
them.	  The	  goal	  of	  EU	  membership	  would	  have	  given	  the	  Bosnian	  population	  a	  
common	  cause	  around	  which	  to	  rally,	  and	  would	  have	  increased	  their	  incentive	  to	  
participate	  in	  the	  political	  process.	  Thus,	  the	  “carrot”	  of	  EU	  membership	  also	  has	  
implications	  on	  my	  variables	  of	  citizenship	  and	  participation.	  	  
The	  “carrot”	  of	  European	  Union	  membership	  was	  successfully	  manipulated	  
in	  many	  other	  Eastern	  and	  Southeastern	  European	  countries,	  including	  Croatia	  and	  
Serbia,	  where	  the	  EU’s	  leverage	  pushed	  these	  countries	  toward	  democratization	  and	  
other	  reforms.	  Though	  the	  process	  of	  entering	  the	  EU	  “entails	  a	  wider	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transformation	  of	  domestic	  policy-­‐making	  and	  a	  greater	  pooling	  of	  sovereignty	  than	  
entering	  any	  other	  international	  organization	  in	  the	  world,”	  EU	  membership	  offers	  
tremendous	  benefits	  that	  can	  be	  uniquely	  effective	  in	  triggering	  “different	  
mechanisms	  for	  domestic	  change	  in	  candidates.”77	  Most	  notably	  for	  the	  case	  of	  
Bosnia,	  the	  “carrot”	  of	  EU	  membership	  has	  been	  known	  to	  lead	  to	  the	  “de-­‐escalation	  
of	  tensions	  between	  ethnic	  majorities	  and	  ethnic	  minorities	  in	  many	  prospective	  EU	  
members.”78	  
Much	  like	  in	  these	  other	  Eastern	  European	  countries,	  the	  common	  goal	  of	  EU	  
membership	  could	  have	  motivated	  the	  Bosnian	  citizenry	  to	  become	  more	  engaged	  
in	  a	  political	  process.	  If	  the	  European	  Union	  had	  told	  Bosnia	  that	  it	  had	  to	  be	  a	  
functioning	  democracy,	  had	  to	  have	  a	  market	  economy,	  had	  to	  rid	  its	  political	  
parties	  of	  corruption	  in	  order	  to	  qualify	  for	  membership;	  but	  did	  not	  tell	  the	  
Bosnians	  how	  achieve	  these	  goals,	  Bosnians	  would	  have	  had	  incentive	  to	  work	  
together	  to	  find	  a	  solution	  to	  this	  common	  goal.	  The	  Bosnian	  population	  would	  have	  
had	  a	  clear-­‐cut	  reason	  to	  rally	  around	  a	  national	  cause,	  to	  actually	  participate,	  and	  to	  
help	  the	  government	  arrive	  at	  this	  goal.	  While	  the	  importance	  of	  political	  
participation	  in	  helping	  to	  rebuild	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  state	  is	  apparent	  to	  most	  policy	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6.	  Education,	  Citizenship,	  and	  Political	  Participation:	  Introducing	  my	  Variables	  
for	  Post-­‐Conflict	  Reconstruction	  
	  
While	  both	  the	  Clinton	  administration’s	  model	  and	  the	  model	  of	  Stephen	  L.	  
Burg	  included	  essential	  elements	  for	  peacebuilding	  and	  statebuilding,	  they	  each	  
overlooked	  the	  importance	  of	  variables	  that	  could	  provide	  for	  a	  process	  of	  nation	  
building.	  The	  three	  variables	  that	  I	  propose:	  education,	  citizenship,	  and	  political	  
participation,	  are	  based	  on	  my	  understanding	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  including	  this	  
process	  in	  a	  country’s	  post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction.	  These	  variables	  build	  on	  one	  
another	  in	  order	  to	  increase	  constituent	  interest	  in	  the	  Bosnian	  state,	  and	  to	  
increase	  the	  legitimacy	  and	  stability	  of	  the	  state	  [See	  Appendix	  III].	  I	  present	  these	  
variables	  as	  a	  set,	  meaning	  that	  the	  three	  must	  be	  implemented	  together	  in	  order	  to	  
be	  effective.	  These	  variables	  could	  successful	  be	  implemented	  even	  today,	  in	  2012.	  	  
	  
6.1	  Education	  	  
In	  defining	  variables	  that	  would	  work	  to	  restore	  Bosnian	  state	  legitimacy,	  I	  
begin	  with	  education.	  Education	  reforms	  were	  not	  even	  considered	  by	  the	  Dayton	  
Accords.	  As	  such,	  Bosnia’s	  education	  system	  remains	  almost	  entirely	  segregated	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  ethnicity—no	  Ministry	  of	  Education	  at	  the	  state	  level	  was	  ever	  
established.	  The	  system	  instead	  involves	  twelve	  separate	  ministries	  of	  education:	  
one	  for	  the	  Republika	  Srpska	  and	  the	  Federation,	  and	  an	  additional	  one	  for	  each	  
canton.	  This	  divisive	  education	  system	  is	  problematic	  for	  two	  particular	  reasons:	  the	  
assurance	  that	  ethnic	  tensions	  are	  institutionalized	  and	  will	  be	  passed	  down	  from	  
generation	  to	  generation,	  and	  the	  further	  decentralization	  of	  Bosnia’s	  political	  and	  
social	  institutions.	  The	  segregated	  education	  system	  has	  effectively	  ensured	  that	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Bosnian	  children	  are	  taught	  “their	  parents’	  nationalist	  hatred	  with	  government	  
imprimatur.”79	  	  
Dayton’s	  omission	  of	  a	  framework	  for	  educational	  reforms	  is	  especially	  
disconcerting	  in	  light	  of	  the	  extensive	  body	  of	  research	  on	  the	  effects	  that	  
desegregated	  education	  can	  have	  in	  decreasing	  tensions	  in	  multi-­‐ethnic	  societies.	  
Education	  has	  traditionally	  been	  regarded	  as	  “an	  institution	  that	  reflects	  the	  social	  
differences	  that	  exist	  in	  society,	  and	  which	  are	  reproduced	  from	  generation	  to	  
generation	  through	  socialization.”	  Many	  believe	  that	  desegregated	  education	  has	  the	  
capacity	  to	  create	  social	  change	  through	  its	  identification	  and	  normalization	  of	  the	  
sources	  of	  conflict.80	  The	  contact	  hypothesis	  goes	  so	  far	  as	  to	  claim	  that	  increased	  
contact	  amongst	  groups	  who	  live	  in	  close	  proximity	  can	  lessen	  ethnic	  conflict.81	  
Consider,	  for	  example,	  Northern	  Ireland’s	  education	  reforms	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  
early	  1980s,	  or	  education	  reforms	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1950s.	  Both	  
exemplify	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  educational	  desegregation	  in	  reducing	  these	  social	  
tensions.	  
	   The	  prototypical	  case	  used	  to	  prove	  the	  veracity	  of	  the	  contact	  hypothesis	  is	  
Civil	  Rights-­‐era	  United	  States,	  where	  educational	  desegregation	  was	  credited	  with	  a	  
decrease	  in	  racial	  tensions.	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  one	  of	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  Brown	  v.	  
Board	  of	  Education	  decision	  was	  to	  rethink	  historical	  relationships	  between	  groups	  
in	  American	  society.	  Recent	  studies	  by	  Yun,	  Kurlaender,	  and	  Duncan	  (et	  al.)	  have	  
                                                
79 International Crisis Group, “Bosnia: State Institutions Under Attack,” Europe Briefing 62 (May 2011) 
80 Bernadette C. Hayes and Ian McAllister, “Integrated Education, Intergroup Relations, and Political 
Identities in Northern Ireland,” Social Problems (November 2007): 456. 
81 Gordon W. Allport (1954) is often credited with the development of this theory, the “Contact 
Hypothesis” which claims more specifically that intergroup contact between individuals belonging to 
antagonistic social groups (defined by culture, ethnicity, language, race, nationality, etc.) can improve 
intergroup relations by improving understanding and reducing negative stereotypes. 
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shown	  that	  students	  who	  attend	  more	  diverse	  schools	  “have	  higher	  comfort	  levels	  
with	  members	  of	  racial	  groups	  different	  than	  their	  own,	  an	  increased	  sense	  of	  civil	  
engagement	  and	  a	  greater	  desire	  to	  live	  and	  work	  in	  a	  multiracial	  settlings	  relative	  
to	  their	  more	  segregated	  peers.”	  Researchers	  also	  concluded	  “that	  desegregated	  
experiences	  for	  African	  American	  students	  lead	  to	  increased	  interaction	  with	  
members	  of	  other	  racial	  groups	  in	  later	  years.”82	  These	  findings	  corroborate	  with	  
earlier	  ones	  suggesting	  that	  white	  students	  in	  integrated	  settings	  exhibit	  more	  racial	  
tolerance	  over	  time	  than	  their	  counterparts	  in	  segregated	  environments.83	  
Northern	  Ireland	  is	  a	  comparable	  example	  of	  the	  contact-­‐hypothesis	  
phenomenon.	  Until	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s,	  North	  Ireland	  had	  two	  separate,	  
religiously	  based	  education	  systems	  at	  both	  the	  primary	  and	  the	  secondary	  levels.	  In	  
1968,	  with	  the	  commencement	  of	  civil	  disturbances,	  the	  segregated	  school	  system	  
became	  a	  source	  of	  concern	  for	  educators	  and	  activists	  who	  shared	  the	  belief	  that	  
segregation	  would	  lead	  to	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  religiously	  based	  violence	  and	  
discrimination.	  Studies	  by	  Hayes	  and	  McAllister	  on	  the	  relative	  effects	  of	  segregated	  
and	  integrated	  education	  systems	  in	  Northern	  Ireland	  have	  shown	  schooling	  to	  have	  
a	  great	  effect	  on	  national	  identification	  and,	  most	  importantly	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  
this	  paper,	  constitutional	  preference.	  
                                                
82 See Amy Stuart Wells and Robert L. Crain, Perpetuation Theory and the Long-term Effects of School 
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Protestants	  who	  attended	  an	  integrated	  school	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  “move	  
away	  from	  their	  traditional	  territorial	  allegiance—maintenance	  of	  the	  link	  with	  
Britain—and	  express	  an	  undecided	  position”	  on	  constitutional	  matters.84	  Similarly,	  
“Catholics	  who	  had	  attended	  either	  a	  formally	  or	  informally	  integrated	  school	  were	  
significantly	  more	  likely	  to	  abandon	  their	  traditional	  territorial	  allegiance	  and	  
support	  retention	  of	  the	  link	  with	  Britain	  than	  their	  colleagues	  who	  had	  attended	  a	  
religiously	  segregated	  school.”85	  Northern	  Ireland’s	  experiences	  with	  integration	  
suggest	  that	  inter-­‐group	  contact	  during	  education	  can	  positively	  affect	  the	  
willingness	  of	  divergent	  ethnic	  groups	  to	  support	  integrationist	  political	  
approaches.	  This	  facet	  of	  Northern	  Ireland’s	  experience	  reflects	  significantly	  on	  the	  
importance	  of	  an	  integrated	  education	  system	  in	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina.	  The	  fact	  that	  
integrationist	  schooling	  both	  encouraged	  students	  to	  move	  away	  from	  their	  
traditional	  territorial	  alliances	  and	  fostered	  an	  increase	  in	  political	  support	  for	  an	  
integrated	  state	  substantiates	  the	  importance	  of	  my	  variables	  in	  increasing	  state	  
legitimacy	  for	  post-­‐conflict	  states.	  	  
Like	  Northern	  Ireland’s	  in	  the	  1970s,	  Bosnia’s	  education	  system	  as	  of	  2012	  
consists	  mainly	  of	  schools	  that	  are	  entirely	  segregated	  by	  specific	  regional	  policies.86	  
In	  arguing	  for	  a	  desegregated	  school	  system	  in	  Bosnia,	  there	  are	  logistical	  hurdles	  
that	  must	  be	  addressed—namely	  the	  fact	  that	  spatial	  divisions	  between	  the	  two	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in a trans-ethnic setting. 
 
55  
entities	  provide	  limited	  opportunity	  for	  school	  desegregation.	  Ideally,	  a	  
desegregated	  school	  system	  would	  incorporate	  students	  from	  all	  three	  ethnic	  
groups.	  Given	  the	  territorial	  distribution	  of	  these	  ethnic	  groups,	  this	  would	  be	  close	  
to	  impossible	  short	  of	  suggesting	  a	  complete	  overhaul	  of	  the	  Federation	  and	  the	  
Republika	  structure.	  Nonetheless,	  neither	  the	  Republika	  Srpska	  nor	  the	  Federation	  
of	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  are	  entirely	  ethnically	  homogenous.	  While	  the	  republic	  is	  
predominantly	  Bosnian	  Serb,	  some	  Bosniaks	  and	  Bosnian	  Croats	  do	  live	  within	  the	  
Republic’s	  borders.	  The	  Federation,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  contains	  fewer	  Bosnian	  
Serbs,	  but	  boasts	  fairly	  well-­‐distributed	  percentages	  of	  Bosniaks	  and	  Bosnian	  
Croats—cantons	  are	  never,	  in	  fact,	  entirely	  homogenous.87	  Thus,	  while	  Bosnia’s	  
current	  ethnic	  divisions	  by	  region	  would	  not	  allow	  for	  a	  perfectly	  equal	  distribution	  
of	  ethnic	  groups	  in	  every	  school	  system,	  the	  possibility	  for	  learning	  amongst	  
ethnically	  diverse	  peers	  still	  exists.	  	  	  
The	  ethnically	  divided	  education	  system	  in	  Bosnia	  has	  lead	  to	  increased	  
ethnic	  tensions,	  and	  a	  general	  confusion	  about	  national	  history	  and	  identity.	  Young	  
people	  are	  educated	  within	  their	  own	  ethnic	  groups,	  precluding	  the	  possibility	  of	  
developing	  future	  cross-­‐ethnic	  ties.	  Predictably,	  Bosnian	  students	  are	  taught	  three	  
different,	  often	  mutually	  exclusive	  histories	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  War.	  Each	  of	  these	  
histories	  identifies	  a	  different	  ethnic	  group	  as	  “the	  aggressor”	  and	  “the	  victim.”	  This	  
ensures	  that,	  starting	  at	  a	  very	  young	  age;	  students	  are	  taught	  that	  their	  neighbors	  
are	  to	  blame	  for	  the	  injustices	  faced	  by	  their	  particular	  ethnic	  group.	  The	  “implicit	  
and	  explicit	  separation	  and	  exclusion”	  that	  this	  phenomenon	  of	  segregated	  schools	  
                                                
87 Herzegovina-Heretva Canton, and Central Bosnia Canton are, notably, the most ethnically missed of the 
ten cantons in the Federation. 
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conveys	  “has	  asserted	  itself	  in	  ways	  never	  imagined	  in	  pre-­‐war	  Bosnia."88	  	  
The	  city	  of	  Vitez	  in	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina	  is	  one	  of	  many	  places	  where	  the	  
school	  district	  struggled	  desperately	  with	  issues	  of	  ethnic	  tensions	  in	  the	  education	  
system.	  Vitez	  suffers	  from	  a	  problem	  that	  is	  endemic	  in	  Bosnia—the	  older	  
generation	  is	  still	  hyper-­‐aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that,	  though	  they	  now	  live	  as	  neighbors,	  
they	  were	  fighting	  against	  each	  other	  only	  a	  fifteen	  years	  ago.89	  The	  ethnic	  tensions	  
in	  Vitez,	  like	  most	  cities	  in	  the	  Federation	  of	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina,	  exist	  mainly	  
between	  the	  Croats	  and	  the	  Bosnian	  Muslims,	  not	  the	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  and	  the	  
Bosnian	  Serbs.	  The	  higher	  concentration	  of	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  in	  the	  Srpska	  Republika	  
has	  made	  it	  so	  that	  the	  Federation	  has	  an	  especially	  high	  percentage	  of	  Croats	  and	  
Bosnian	  Muslims.	  While	  these	  two	  ethnic	  groups	  were	  not	  pitted	  against	  each	  other	  
as	  savagely	  as	  the	  Bosnian	  Muslims	  and	  the	  Bosnian	  Serbs	  during	  the	  Bosnian	  War,	  
tensions	  still	  run	  high.	  
Vitez	  experienced	  a	  considerable	  lack	  of	  reconciliation	  between	  amongst	  the	  
older	  generations	  living	  in	  the	  city.	  Parents	  still	  remember	  the	  war	  vividly—some	  
even	  fought	  on	  either	  the	  Bosniak	  or	  Croat	  side.	  These	  parents	  remain	  unwilling	  to	  
send	  their	  children	  to	  school	  with	  children	  of	  other	  ethnic	  groups.	  Said	  Borislav	  
Krizanac,	  a	  Croat	  flooring	  installer,	  “	  I	  would	  rather	  move	  out	  of	  town	  than	  send	  my	  
child	  to	  a	  mixed	  school.	  .	  .there	  is	  big	  hatred	  there.’”90	  Despite	  this,	  Vitez,	  like	  a	  few	  
other	  cities,	  has	  experimented	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “mixed	  school.”	  Vitez’s	  mixed	  
                                                
88 National Democratic Institute, Bosnia-Herzegovina Democracy Assessment Report. 
http://www.ndi.org/files/Bosnia_Assessment_Report.pdf 





school,	  now	  called	  the	  Vitez	  Primary	  School,	  hosts	  820	  students	  in	  the	  Croat	  main	  
building,	  and	  500	  Muslims	  in	  the	  annex.	  The	  schools	  operate	  on	  the	  same	  schedule,	  
but	  they	  are	  taught	  completely	  different	  curricula.	  Though	  the	  students	  are	  
technically	  separated,	  children	  say	  that	  fights	  are	  common	  and	  are	  often	  triggered	  
by	  ethnically	  charged	  comments.	  
According	  to	  the	  Bosnian	  Federation’s	  Minister	  of	  Education	  and	  Science,	  
Damir	  Masic,	  there	  are	  thirty-­‐four	  schools	  in	  the	  Bosnian	  Federation	  that	  can	  be	  
categorized	  as	  “divided.”	  While	  they	  differ	  in	  some	  respects,	  the	  unifying	  feature	  is	  
that	  they	  all	  teach	  a	  separate	  curriculum	  to	  each	  ethnic	  group.	  While	  some	  members	  
of	  the	  older	  generation	  are	  still	  hesitant	  about	  sending	  their	  children	  to	  school	  with	  
members	  of	  other	  ethnic	  groups,	  Bosnian’s	  education	  ministers	  are	  aware	  of	  the	  
problem	  that	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  these	  divisions	  have	  caused,	  and	  believe	  
unification	  to	  be	  a	  priority.	  However,	  the	  fact	  that	  education	  policy	  has	  been	  run	  
exclusively	  by	  the	  Federation’s	  ten	  cantons	  since	  1996	  makes	  the	  achievement	  of	  
such	  unification	  nearly	  impossible.	  	  	  
Some	  international	  organizations,	  such	  as	  the	  Organization	  for	  Security	  and	  
Cooperation	  in	  Europe	  (OSCE),	  still	  believe	  that	  education	  reforms	  could	  effectively	  
reduce	  ethnic	  tensions,	  even	  at	  later	  stages	  in	  the	  reconstruction	  process.	  The	  
OSCE’s	  efforts	  have	  been	  multi-­‐faceted,	  and	  have	  been	  based	  on	  the	  underlying	  
conclusion	  that	  “the	  division	  of	  a	  curricula	  into	  three	  different	  and	  often	  mutually-­‐
opposed	  versions	  of	  history	  poses	  a	  considerable	  threat	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  shared	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sense	  of	  citizenship	  and	  future	  social	  cohesion	  in	  BiH.”91	  The	  OSCE	  is	  of	  the	  opinion	  
that	  this	  problem	  manifests	  itself	  most	  evidently	  in	  Bosnia	  history	  textbook	  
industry,	  where	  the	  content	  of	  textbooks	  has	  remained	  highly	  politicized.	  To	  date,	  
the	  different	  textbooks	  used	  by	  each	  ethnic	  group	  have	  actively	  promoted	  
“competing	  narratives	  of	  victimhood.”92	  Some	  even	  contain	  “nationalism	  and	  hatred	  
towards	  other	  groups	  and	  religions.”93	  
The	  OSCE	  has	  recommended	  that	  the	  textbook	  industry	  be	  reformed	  in	  order	  
to	  offer	  Bosnians	  a	  more	  unified	  understanding	  of	  the	  country’s	  history.	  This	  
recommendation	  is	  predicated	  on	  the	  notion	  that	  any	  promotion	  of	  post-­‐war	  
reconciliation	  would	  install	  greater	  tolerance	  in	  younger	  generations	  of	  Bosnians.	  In	  
2004,	  the	  OSCE	  set	  up	  two	  commissions—one	  for	  history	  and	  one	  for	  geography—in	  
order	  to	  develop	  guidelines	  for	  these	  textbooks.94	  These	  commissions	  seek	  to	  
ensure	  that	  all	  students	  in	  Bosnia	  have	  a	  basic	  understanding	  of	  the	  history	  and	  
geography	  of	  all	  three	  ethnic	  groups,	  and	  seek	  to	  ensure	  that	  any	  disputed	  histories	  
are	  explained	  correctly.95	  In	  suggesting	  that	  education	  about	  difference	  could	  instill	  
in	  Bosnians	  a	  greater	  acceptance	  of	  their	  peers’	  background,	  the	  OSCE’s	  policy	  
recommendations	  echo	  the	  tenets	  of	  the	  contact	  hypothesis.	  Through	  contact	  with	  
children	  from	  other	  ethnic	  groups	  who	  were	  learning	  the	  same	  history,	  these	  
students	  would	  have	  been	  able	  to	  develop	  a	  sense	  of	  what	  it	  meant	  to	  be	  a	  member	  
                                                
91 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE): Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
“Modernizing History Teaching: Textbooks and Curriculum,” (December, 2010). 
92 Ibid. 
93 Helene Harroff-Tavel, “Tackling School Textbook Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” OSCE Mission 
to Bosnia and Herzegovina (November 14, 2005). 
http://www.osce.org/bih/57453 
94 These commissions each consist of one Serb, one Bosniak, one Croat (from both the Federation and the 
Republic), and one representative for national minorities.  
95 Helene Harroff-Tavel, “Tackling School Textbook Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” 
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The	  relevance	  of	  developing	  a	  sense	  of	  national	  identity	  relates	  directly	  to	  my	  
second	  variable,	  citizenship.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  shared	  sense	  of	  citizenship	  that	  
would	  emerge	  lies	  in	  the	  assumption	  that,	  when	  citizens	  feel	  connected	  to	  each	  
other	  and	  to	  their	  state,	  they	  become	  more	  invested	  in	  working	  to	  ensure	  the	  state’s	  
functionality.	  This	  phenomenon	  works	  in	  the	  other	  direction	  as	  well.	  Due	  to	  the	  
apparent	  lack	  of	  constituent	  interest	  in	  state-­‐level	  politics,	  political	  actors	  in	  Bosnia	  
have	  seen	  no	  real	  incentive	  to	  enact	  change,	  or	  to	  look	  after	  the	  needs	  of	  their	  
constituents.	  The	  importance	  of	  efforts	  to	  desegregate	  the	  education	  system,	  and	  to	  
teach	  acceptance	  at	  an	  early	  age	  lie	  in	  their	  effects	  on	  the	  average	  Bosnian’s	  sense	  of	  
citizenship,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  their	  implications	  on	  Bosnians	  ability	  (or	  inability)	  to	  trust	  
in	  their	  political	  system.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   Even	  today,	  in	  2012,	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  desegregated	  education	  system,	  
and	  concomitant	  teaching	  of	  one	  historical	  narrative	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  War	  could	  lead	  
to	  the	  emergence	  of	  sense	  of	  belonging	  to	  the	  Bosnian	  state	  outside	  of	  belonging	  to	  a	  
particular	  ethnic	  group.	  This	  sense	  of	  belonging,	  or	  shared	  sense	  of	  citizenship	  could	  
allow	  Bosnian	  citizens	  to	  form	  an	  attachment	  to	  their	  nation	  and	  to	  their	  state.	  This	  
could	  subsequently	  encourage	  citizens	  to	  build	  an	  interest	  in	  state-­‐level	  politics	  as	  a	  
means	  of	  perpetuating	  the	  stability	  of	  their	  state.	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Citizens	  form	  connections	  based	  on	  the	  “ways	  in	  which	  they	  govern	  
themselves	  and	  agree	  to	  be	  governed,	  [and]	  by	  the	  organization	  of	  their	  conflicts	  in	  
differences.”	  96	  	  Thus,	  it	  is	  precisely	  in	  turbulent	  periods	  of	  constitutional	  change	  
that	  a	  shared	  sense	  of	  citizenship	  is	  most	  important.	  Citizenship	  theory	  posits	  that	  a	  
unified	  and	  shared	  conception	  of	  citizenship	  may	  help	  keep	  political	  contestation	  to	  
a	  minimum,	  and	  help	  to	  restore	  faith	  the	  government.	  When	  institutions	  face	  a	  
process	  of	  redevelopment,	  a	  “robust	  notion	  of	  citizenship”	  can	  greatly	  assist	  in	  the	  
development	  of	  new,	  more	  functional	  institutions—ones	  that	  are	  made	  stronger	  by	  
the	  citizenry’s	  faith	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  become	  fully	  functional.	   	   	   	  
	   Citizenship	  theory	  also	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina’s	  
constitution	  defined	  citizenship	  in	  ways	  that	  did	  not	  encourage	  a	  sense	  of	  
connection	  to	  the	  state.	  Annex	  4	  of	  the	  Dayton	  Accords	  outlined	  the	  Constitution	  of	  
Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina.	  Article	  I.7	  of	  the	  constitution	  defines	  the	  citizenship	  of	  Bosnia-­‐
Herzegovina,	  and	  states	  that	  Bosnian	  citizens	  are	  also	  official	  citizens	  of	  their	  
respective	  entity.	  The	  constitution	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  Bosnians	  cannot	  simply	  be	  
citizens	  of	  the	  state—they	  must	  also	  be	  a	  citizen	  either	  of	  the	  Federation,	  or	  the	  
Republic.	  This	  ensures	  that	  Bosnian	  citizens	  are	  effectively	  required	  to	  hold	  dual-­‐
citizenship:	  one	  for	  their	  actual	  nation,	  and	  one	  for	  their	  territorial	  region.	  As	  such,	  
the	  constitution’s	  provisions	  of	  citizenship	  do	  not	  foster	  a	  unified	  notion	  of	  what	  it	  is	  
to	  Bosnia.	  Instead,	  they	  highlight	  the	  notion	  that	  Bosnian	  citizens	  are	  ruled	  equally,	  
if	  not	  primarily,	  by	  the	  entity	  in	  which	  they	  live.97	  In	  decentralizing	  the	  very	  notion	  
                                                
96 This theory was developed by Herman Van Gunsteren. See A Theory of Citizenship: Organizing 
Plurality in Contemporary Democracies (Westview Press, 1998) 
97 The Dayton Accords, Annex 4, Article I.7. 
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of	  “citizenship,”	  these	  provisions	  overlooked	  the	  vital	  role	  that	  citizenship	  can	  in	  
state	  reconstruction—both	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  “citizens	  should	  play	  an	  active	  role	  in	  it	  
[and]	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  constitution	  should	  foster	  citizenship.98	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	   	  
6.3	  Political	  Participation	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   A	  unified	  sense	  of	  citizenship	  has	  been	  a	  proven	  catalyst	  for	  political	  
participation.	  Thus,	  the	  decentralized	  nature	  of	  the	  Constitution’s	  definition	  of	  
citizenship	  is	  a	  partial	  explanation	  for	  Bosnia’s	  lack	  of	  political	  participation,	  my	  
third	  variable,	  at	  the	  state	  level.	  This	  lack	  of	  participation	  can	  also	  be	  attributed	  to	  
the	  fact	  that	  Bosnian	  citizens	  do	  not	  see	  state-­‐level	  politics	  as	  directly	  affecting	  their	  
own	  lives.	  Bosnians	  are,	  however,	  much	  more	  motivated	  to	  participate	  in	  local	  
governance	  processes,	  because	  they	  view	  them	  as	  having	  an	  actual	  calculable	  impact	  
on	  their	  ways	  of	  life,	  and	  on	  the	  region	  in	  which	  they	  live.	  Governance	  processes	  at	  
the	  sub-­‐state	  level	  remain	  organized	  around	  the	  interests	  of	  specific	  ethnic	  groups	  
and	  are	  concerned	  “with	  actions	  of	  a	  group	  or	  an	  individual	  arising	  from	  the	  
imputation	  of	  common	  ancestry	  to	  themselves	  or	  to	  others.”99	  	   	   	  
	   This	  reality	  relates	  directly	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  since	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  
Dayton	  Accords,	  all	  facets	  of	  Bosnian	  life	  have	  been	  organized	  around	  ethnic	  
boundaries.	  A	  culture	  of	  tolerance,	  one	  that	  is	  invested	  in	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  state,	  
cannot	  develop	  in	  a	  society	  that	  is	  predicated	  on	  institutionalized	  ethnic	  barriers.	  
My	  third	  variable,	  political	  participation,	  is	  key	  to	  reorganizing	  life	  around	  issues	  at	  
                                                
98 Van Gunsteren, A Theory of Citizenship, 5. 
99 Nelson Kasfir, “Explaining Ethnic Participation,” World Politics (April, 1979): 367. 
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the	  state-­‐level	  and	  ensuring	  that	  Bosnians	  regain	  interest	  in	  participating	  in	  politics	  
that	  do	  not	  speak	  purely	  to	  ethnic	  interests.	  I	  posit	  that	  once	  Bosnians	  develop	  a	  
shared	  sense	  of	  citizenship	  through	  desegregated	  education,	  an	  interest	  in	  state	  
affairs	  and	  politics	  would	  surely	  grow.	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   The	  lack	  of	  political	  participation	  in	  Bosnia	  is	  evidenced	  by	  voter	  turn	  out	  
rates	  in	  national	  elections.	  Voter	  turnout	  for	  the	  2010	  presidential	  election	  was	  only	  
56.49%	  of	  registered	  voters,	  compared	  to	  a	  70.74%	  who	  voted	  in	  the	  1998	  
presidential	  election.100	  It	  is	  particularly	  worrisome	  that	  these	  rates	  actually	  
decreased	  over	  time.	  A	  state	  experiencing	  a	  successful	  transition	  out	  of	  conflict	  
would	  instead	  have	  exhibited	  calculable	  signs	  of	  improvement	  in	  its	  levels	  of	  
political	  participation	  during	  the	  first	  few	  post-­‐conflict	  elections.	  Take	  Rwanda	  and	  
Serbia,	  as	  examples	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  states	  exhibiting	  a	  steady	  rise	  in	  voter	  turnout	  
rates:	  Rwanda	  experienced	  a	  96.55%	  turnout	  for	  its	  Presidential	  election	  in	  2003,	  
and	  a	  97.51%	  turnout	  for	  its	  presidential	  election	  in	  2010.101	  Serbia,	  a	  state	  that	  did	  
not	  experience	  comparable	  levels	  of	  conflict,	  but	  merits	  comparison	  due	  to	  its	  
proximity	  to	  Bosnia,	  experienced	  a	  47.75%	  turnout	  in	  2004,	  and	  a	  68.12%	  turnout	  
in	  2008.102	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   Voters	  in	  Bosnia	  have	  justified	  their	  lack	  of	  participation	  in	  elections	  by	  
stating	  that	  “all	  politicians	  are	  the	  same,”	  and	  that	  none	  of	  them	  have	  a	  reputation	  
                                                
100 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm?CountryCode=BA  
101 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance: Rwanda. 
http://www.idea.int/vt/country_view.cfm?id=192#pres 




for	  keeping	  their	  word.103	  These	  widely	  held	  beliefs	  suggest	  that	  political	  corruption	  
acts	  as	  a	  barrier	  to	  participation.	  As	  a	  means	  of	  ensuring	  a	  rise	  in	  political	  
participation,	  Bosnia	  would	  therefore	  have	  to	  implement	  a	  process	  to	  reform	  and	  
de-­‐corrupt	  its	  political	  parties.	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   Generally	  speaking,	  the	  original	  purpose	  of	  political	  parties	  was	  to	  provide	  
transparency	  and	  legitimacy	  to	  the	  government	  through	  representation	  of	  
constituent	  interests.	  Political	  parties	  ideally	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  
“improvement	  of	  democratic	  institutions	  and	  the	  attainment	  of	  more	  liberal	  and	  
accountable	  governance.”	  As	  such,	  they	  are	  held	  partially	  responsible	  for	  developing	  
citizens’	  capacity	  to	  make	  democracy	  work	  through	  “routine	  forms	  of	  political	  
participation,	  but	  also	  [through]	  the	  skills	  and	  propensity	  to	  organize	  for	  a	  better,	  
more	  just,	  and	  inclusive	  democracy.”104	  	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   In	  post-­‐conflict	  states,	  political	  parties	  rarely	  meet	  these	  objectives.	  Weak	  or	  
ineffective	  parties	  have	  often	  been	  faulted	  with	  endemic	  lack	  of	  political	  
participation.105	  As	  political	  parties	  have	  failed	  to	  provide	  these	  goods,	  they	  become	  
part	  of	  Bosnia’s	  root	  problems	  of	  instability,	  and	  it	  becomes	  necessary	  to	  reform	  
them	  in	  order	  to	  resolve	  the	  systemic	  issues	  with	  political	  participation.	  In	  order	  to	  
resolve	  these	  issues,	  Bosnia	  would	  have	  to	  tackle	  issues	  of	  corruption	  within	  its	  
political	  parties,	  and	  would	  have	  to	  ensure	  that	  these	  parties	  accurately	  represent	  
the	  interests	  of	  their	  constituents.	  In	  Bosnia,	  political	  parties	  remain	  divided	  along	  
                                                
103 Joanna Kakissis, “Is Bosnia One Step Closer to Unity—or Collapse?” Time World (October 4, 2010). 
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104 Larry Diamond, Cultivating Democratic Citizenship: Education for New Century of Democracy in the 
Americas,” Excerpt from 1996 Address at Buenos Aires Conference (1996). 
105 Carothers, Thomas, Confronting the Weakest Link: Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies,” 
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006). 
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ethnic	  lines	  and	  try	  to	  gain	  popularity	  by	  “corralling	  their	  constituencies	  into	  ethnic	  
voting	  blocs.”	  Three	  main	  ethno-­‐national	  parties	  thus	  dominate	  the	  political	  scene:	  
the	  Bosniak	  Party	  of	  Democratic	  Action	  (SDA),	  the	  Serb	  Democratic	  Party	  (SDS),	  and	  
the	  Croatian	  Democratic	  Union	  of	  Bosnia	  and	  Herzegovina	  (HDZ).	  These	  parties	  
remain	  rife	  with	  corruption,	  and	  voters	  understand	  that	  Bosnian	  state-­‐level	  politics	  
are	  more	  about	  power	  and	  profit	  than	  about	  the	  representation	  of	  constituent	  
interests,	  be	  they	  ethnic	  or	  national.106	  	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	  
	   The	  goal	  in	  increasing	  political	  participation	  is	  to	  encourage	  the	  interest	  of	  
political	  actors	  in	  working	  to	  develop	  a	  more	  inclusive,	  fully	  representative	  
government	  capable	  of	  implementing	  reforms	  and	  policy	  changes	  as	  needed.	  In	  
post-­‐Dayton	  Bosnia,	  political	  actors	  lack	  the	  incentive	  to	  represent	  their	  
constituents.	  This	  contributes	  significantly	  to	  the	  instability	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  state.	  
Bosnia	  is,	  technically	  speaking,	  a	  participatory	  democracy.	  However,	  citizens	  feel	  no	  
inclination	  to	  participate,	  as	  their	  interests	  are	  not	  well	  represented.	  	  
	  
Synthesizing	  My	  Variables	  	  
The	  purpose	  of	  my	  set	  of	  variables	  is	  to	  initiate	  a	  process	  that	  would	  end	  in	  
increased	  levels	  of	  state	  legitimacy.	  A	  state	  that	  experiences	  a	  rise	  in	  political	  
participation	  can	  assume	  that	  its	  citizens	  have	  some	  faith	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  state-­‐level	  
politics	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  improvement	  of	  the	  status	  quo.	  These	  variables	  run	  in	  a	  
sequence:	  I	  posit	  that	  decentralized	  education	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  unified	  notion	  of	  
                                                




citizenship,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  would	  lead	  to	  increased	  levels	  of	  political	  participation.	  It	  
can	  be	  inferred	  that,	  were	  the	  Bosnian	  state	  to	  experience	  increased	  levels	  of	  
political	  participation,	  increased	  state	  legitimacy	  would	  quickly	  follow.	  A	  
desegregated	  education	  system	  would	  naturally	  lead	  to	  increased	  levels	  of	  state	  
legitimacy	  by	  increasing	  Bosnians’	  sense	  of	  national	  identity,	  and	  thus	  increase	  
interest	  in	  political	  participation	  at	  the	  state-­‐level,	  including	  voting	  in	  elections	  and	  
organizing	  around	  non-­‐ethnic	  political	  causes.	  107	  As	  explained	  in	  the	  previous	  
section,	  increases	  in	  political	  participation	  could	  also	  be	  brought	  about	  with	  the	  use	  
of	  incentives,	  or	  the	  identification	  of	  a	  common	  goal,	  such	  as	  potential	  EU	  
membership.	  
While	  these	  three	  variables	  offer	  long-­‐term	  solutions,	  I	  posit	  that	  their	  
application	  even	  now,	  in	  2012,	  could	  increase	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  Bosnian	  state.	  
While	  the	  application	  of	  these	  variables	  in	  1995,	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  reconstruction	  
process,	  could	  more	  quickly	  have	  resolved	  Bosnia’s	  problems	  with	  institutional	  
instability,	  their	  application	  now	  could	  eventually	  lead	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  more	  
stable	  state	  for	  future	  generations.	  In	  offering	  these	  variables,	  a	  goal	  is	  to	  offer	  
policy	  makers	  an	  alternative	  method	  of	  rebuilding	  post-­‐conflict	  states.	  The	  aim	  is	  
not	  to	  discount	  the	  importance	  of	  statebuilding,	  but	  rather	  to	  suggest	  the	  
importance	  of	  simultaneously	  employing	  a	  process	  of	  nation	  building.	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  regional	  policy-­‐makers	  have	  not	  overlooked	  the	  
immediate	  importance	  of	  finding	  a	  new	  solution	  for	  Bosnia.	  In	  April	  of	  2012,	  twenty	  
analysts,	  economists,	  journalists,	  politicians,	  professors,	  and	  NGO	  activists	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collectively	  analyzed	  the	  current	  situation	  in	  Bosnia	  in	  order	  to	  predict	  five	  possible	  
scenarios	  for	  the	  country’s	  future	  in	  thirteen	  years.	  Two	  out	  of	  these	  five	  scenarios	  
foresee	  another	  outbreak	  of	  violence,	  and	  predict	  another	  attempt	  at	  international	  
intervention	  and	  stabilization—not	  a	  particularly	  desirable	  outcome	  for	  Bosnia.108	  
The	  conclusions	  of	  these	  experts	  suggest	  that	  Bosnia	  is	  running	  out	  of	  time.	  A	  nation	  
building	  process	  could	  prevent	  another	  devolution	  into	  violence,	  but	  it	  would	  have	  















                                                





While	  the	  Dayton	  Accords	  were	  successful	  in	  ending	  Bosnia’s	  bloody	  ethnic	  
conflict,	  the	  country	  experienced	  far	  less	  success	  with	  its	  process	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  
reconstruction.	  I	  found	  that	  the	  flaws	  in	  Bosnia’s	  reconstruction	  hinged	  on	  two	  
factors:	  the	  excessive	  involvement	  of	  external	  actors	  in	  the	  reconstruction	  process,	  
and	  the	  decentralization	  of	  the	  state	  through	  its	  division	  into	  two	  entities.	  These	  
factors	  can	  be	  faulted	  with	  the	  country’s	  high	  levels	  of	  instability	  and	  low	  levels	  of	  
political	  participation;	  as	  well	  as	  its	  high	  rates	  of	  unemployment,	  government	  
corruption,	  and	  public	  debt.	  	  
In	  identifying	  “what	  went	  wrong	  in	  Bosnia-­‐Herzegovina,”	  I	  looked	  to	  the	  
reconstruction	  model	  that	  was	  ultimately	  implemented	  by	  the	  Clinton	  
Administration	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  if	  the	  lack	  of	  specific	  variables	  left	  holes	  in	  this	  
reconstruction	  process.	  This	  model	  involved	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  laying	  the	  groundwork	  
for	  future	  institutional	  growth,	  but	  involved	  very	  little	  analysis	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  
this	  groundwork	  would	  actually	  enable	  growth.	  The	  administration’s	  model	  also	  
lacked	  consideration	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  mobilizing	  the	  population	  of	  a	  post-­‐
conflict	  country	  behind	  its	  reconstruction	  process.	  Institutional	  growth	  is	  difficult	  
without	  constituent	  support,	  for	  without	  it,	  political	  actors	  can	  lack	  incentive	  to	  
reform.	  With	  that	  in	  mind,	  I	  identify	  the	  main	  flaws	  in	  the	  administration’s	  
reconstruction	  model:	  its	  exclusive	  focus	  on	  peacebuilding	  and	  statebuilding,	  and	  its	  
subsequent	  ignoring	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  nation	  building	  in	  garnering	  support	  for	  
these	  other	  processes.	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In	  further	  building	  an	  argument	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  my	  three	  variables,	  I	  
looked	  at	  an	  alternate	  reconstruction	  model	  proposed	  by	  Stephen	  L.	  Burg—
involving	  a	  “carrot	  and	  stick”	  approach	  to	  conflict	  mediation.	  Burg’s	  conception	  of	  
this	  approach	  involved	  offering	  Yugoslav	  actors	  an	  incentive	  to	  cooperate	  whilst	  
threatening	  them	  with	  military	  intervention	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  refusal	  to	  cooperate.	  
While	  the	  timing	  of	  Burg’s	  model	  does	  not	  directly	  correspond	  to	  the	  timing	  that	  I	  
focus	  on	  in	  my	  argument,	  Burg’s	  model	  has	  significant	  implications	  on	  ways	  that	  
cooperation	  amongst	  Bosnia’s	  divergent	  ethnic	  groups	  could	  be	  encouraged	  today,	  
in	  2012.	  	  
Today,	  the	  greatest	  conceivable	  incentive	  for	  cooperation	  in	  Bosnia	  is	  the	  
possibility	  of	  EU	  membership.	  Burg’s	  “carrot	  and	  stick”	  approach	  could	  be	  applied	  to	  
Bosnia	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  this	  membership—were	  the	  EU	  to	  promise	  Bosnia	  
membership	  if,	  and	  only	  if,	  they	  met	  certain	  parameters	  for	  reform,	  this	  could	  give	  
the	  Bosnian	  population	  concrete	  incentive	  to	  join	  together	  and	  petition	  for	  these	  
reforms.	  A	  common	  goal	  could	  inspire	  greater	  levels	  of	  political	  participation,	  as	  
Bosnians	  would	  be	  inclined	  to	  work	  together	  to	  rally	  for	  reforms	  and	  for	  the	  
establishment	  of	  more	  functional	  institutions.	  	  
The	  purpose	  of	  analyzing	  these	  two	  models	  is	  to	  suggest	  that	  another	  means	  
of	  increasing	  participation	  and	  legitimacy	  involves	  the	  use	  of	  the	  three	  variables	  that	  
I	  ultimately	  identified	  as	  missing	  from	  the	  reconstruction	  models	  of	  Clinton	  and	  
Burg.	  These	  three	  variables—education,	  citizenship,	  and	  political	  participation—
would	  supplement	  Bosnia’s	  statebuilding	  process	  with	  one	  of	  nation	  building,	  
thereby	  mobilizing	  the	  public	  behind	  Bosnia’s	  reconstruction	  process.	  The	  first	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variable	  that	  I	  identify,	  education,	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  desegregation	  of	  Bosnia’s	  
education	  system.	  Bosnia’s	  current	  segregated	  system	  has	  led	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  
ethnic	  tensions,	  and	  a	  general	  confusion	  about	  national	  identity	  and	  history.	  
	  I	  found	  that	  the	  United	  States’	  and	  Northern	  Ireland’s	  experiences	  with	  
desegregated	  education	  suggest	  that	  contact	  between	  members	  of	  conflicting	  social	  
groups	  can	  indeed	  work	  to	  decrease	  tensions.	  Northern	  Ireland’s	  experience	  is	  
particularly	  important,	  as	  its	  desegregated	  education	  system	  resulted	  in	  citizens	  
voting	  outside	  of	  their	  religious	  and	  territorial	  preferences	  on	  issues	  that	  reflect	  the	  
interests	  of	  the	  state	  on	  the	  whole.	  I	  believe	  that	  desegregated	  education	  in	  Bosnia	  
could	  have	  a	  similar	  effect	  of	  encouraging	  citizens	  to	  vote	  outside	  of	  their	  ethnic	  
preferences	  and	  could	  install	  a	  greater	  tolerance	  in	  younger	  generations	  of	  
Bosnians.	  
I	  posit	  that	  desegregated	  education	  could	  lead	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  cohesive	  
notion	  of	  citizenship—my	  second	  variable.	  Citizenship	  in	  Bosnia	  is	  defined	  both	  at	  
the	  state-­‐level,	  and	  at	  the	  entity-­‐level—increasing	  Bosnians’	  confusion	  about	  where	  
to	  place	  their	  loyalties.	  This	  decentralization	  of	  the	  very	  notion	  of	  citizenship	  has	  
further	  increased	  the	  likelihood	  of	  Bosnians	  feeling	  more	  connected	  to	  their	  entity	  
than	  to	  their	  state.	  As	  I	  see	  it,	  unified	  and	  shared	  conception	  of	  citizenship	  could	  
help	  keep	  political	  contestation	  to	  a	  minimum,	  and	  could	  help	  Bosnians	  build	  an	  
attachment	  to	  their	  state.	  A	  unified	  sense	  of	  citizenship	  could	  also	  increase	  
Bosnian’s	  interest	  in	  the	  stability	  of	  their	  state	  and	  could	  encourage	  Bosnians	  to	  
invest	  in	  building	  and	  maintaining	  this	  stability.	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I	  conclude	  that	  this	  increased	  interest	  could	  manifest	  itself	  in	  an	  upsurge	  of	  
political	  participation,	  my	  third	  variable.	  However,	  in	  order	  for	  Bosnia	  to	  experience	  
a	  significant	  rise	  in	  political	  participation,	  it	  would	  have	  to	  invest	  in	  a	  complete	  
reform	  of	  its	  political	  parties.	  The	  purpose	  of	  a	  political	  party	  is	  to	  accurately	  
represent	  the	  interests	  of	  its	  constituents.	  Endemic	  political	  corruption	  in	  Bosnia	  
has	  made	  it	  such	  that	  political	  parties	  are	  committed	  more	  to	  financial	  gain	  than	  to	  
accurate	  representation.	  The	  aim	  in	  reforming	  political	  parties	  is	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  
interests	  of	  constituents	  are	  well	  represented.	  This	  would	  result	  in	  the	  initiation	  of	  a	  
cycle	  whereby	  accurate	  representation	  would	  encourage	  constituents	  to	  participate	  
in	  state	  politics,	  and	  their	  participation	  would	  continue	  to	  inspire	  political	  actors	  to	  
fight	  for	  institutional	  reforms.	  	  
The	  intention	  behind	  arguing	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  these	  variables	  is	  the	  
notion	  that	  their	  use	  could	  ultimately	  improve	  the	  success	  of	  Bosnia’s	  statebuilding	  
process.	  Implementing	  a	  set	  of	  policies	  and	  institutions	  designed	  to	  support	  a	  
desegregated	  education	  system,	  a	  cohesive	  national	  identity,	  and	  increased	  public	  
participation	  in	  state-­‐level	  politics,	  could	  improve	  Bosnia’s	  chances	  of	  overcoming	  
its	  experiences	  with	  failing	  political	  and	  economic	  institutions;	  chronic	  
unemployment;	  government	  corruption;	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  public	  debt.	  	  
Bosnia’s	  instability	  and	  lack	  of	  growth	  contribute	  to	  the	  ever-­‐increasing	  
likelihood	  that	  the	  country	  will	  re-­‐erupt	  in	  a	  statewide	  outbreak	  of	  ethnic	  violence.	  
In	  closing	  the	  gaps	  in	  Bosnia’s	  current	  process	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  reconstruction,	  the	  
hope	  is	  to	  decrease	  the	  possibility	  of	  another	  war,	  and	  to	  lay	  the	  groundwork	  for	  the	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restoration	  of	  Bosnians’	  faith	  in	  state-­‐level	  politics—thereby	  increasing	  the	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